{"id":1423,"date":"2025-08-16T22:20:31","date_gmt":"2025-08-16T21:20:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/?page_id=1423"},"modified":"2025-08-17T14:11:27","modified_gmt":"2025-08-17T13:11:27","slug":"the-transcendental-argument-for-god-tag","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/the-transcendental-argument-for-god-tag\/","title":{"rendered":"The Transcendental Argument for God (TAG)"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/a>6\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Transcendental Argument for God (TAG)<\/h1>\n

<\/a><\/a><\/a>6.1\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Introduction<\/h2>\n

In this section, we formalise our work of the previous two chapters with transcendental reasoning and demonstrate how Van Til presented his argument designed to demonstrate the existence of God as objectively provable.\u00a0 We consider:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. The distinctive logical form.<\/li>\n
  2. Examine the historical pedigree of the form.<\/li>\n
  3. Formalise the other distinctives of the mode of reasoning.<\/li>\n
  4. Consider the controversies surrounding the conceptual and ontological necessity of the argument form.<\/li>\n
  5. Present Van Til\u2019s proof and consider the criticisms of it and the possible mitigations in recent work.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    <\/a>6.2\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Logical Form and Overview<\/h2>\n

    To formalise the argument of the previous two chapters, the general logical <\/em>form <\/a>[763]<\/sup><\/a> of the transcendental argument is this:<\/p>\n

    Assume X<\/em>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 X is accepted by all participants in the argument, even a local sceptic.<\/p>\n

    Certain forms of global scepticism might not be prepared to accept X or later reject it if they are required to accept Y, but their scepticism is then held to be incoherent (they are rejecting a necessary precondition of formulating their sceptical argument) and there is no argument to be had.\u00a0 We are wishing to engage with those who consider it is possible to argue in a constructive and philosophical manner; to first understand and then make progress towards philosophical solutions to philosophical problems.<\/p>\n

    Demonstrate<\/em> that X presupposes Y (often through a reductio absurdum<\/em> or the impossibility of the contrary).<\/p>\n

    Y is the controversial or contested proposition.<\/p>\n

    Transcendental argumentation stretches all the way back in Western philosophy to Aristotle where he argues transcendentally for the law of non-contradiction.<\/a>[764]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 Aristotle\u2019s point was simple \u2013 if you argue against<\/em> logic, you are assuming<\/em> logic in making an argument against logic and your challenge is incoherent.\u00a0 Bahnsen puts the promise of the form rather less arcanely, if you want to be in the \u201creason giving game\u201d<\/em>, you must play by the rules of that game \u2013 if you deny<\/em> reason as reasonable, there is no need to listen to you as all your own utterances must be irrelevant in their unreasonableness by your own<\/em> standards.<\/a>[765]<\/a>\u00a0 If you believe you can<\/em> demand an answer, you have entered the game, the rules apply<\/em> and those rules disqualify<\/em> you <\/a>[766]<\/a> \u2013 you are of necessity operating on my presuppositions regarding reason whether or not you accept that you are, it is a logical prerequisite of us engaging in any discussion.<\/a>[767]<\/a><\/p>\n

    As mentioned in our previous review, this \u201cscepticism refuting\u201d potential of transcendental argumentation has been what, in the modern debate, <\/a>[768]<\/a> has generated the most interest in them.\u00a0 That the sceptic somehow wins despite all our attempts at providing grounds for reason is what Kant, the most famous exponent of the argument form, finds principally objectionable as found in his famous footnote:<\/p>\n

    \u201c[I]t remains a scandal to philosophy, and to human reason in general, that we should have to accept the existence of things outside us (from which we derive the whole material for our knowledge, even for that of our inner sense) merely on trust,<\/em><\/strong> and have no satisfactory proof with which to counter any opponent who chooses to doubt it\u201d.<\/a>[769]<\/a> (Emphasis original).<\/p>\n

    For many philosophers who believe in discourse and discussion is not just a means but an end, even that progress is possible with philosophical problems, scepticism is a most unsatisfactory terminus.<\/a>[770]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 It was on this basis that we asserted a prima facie<\/em> case for the value and distinctiveness of transcendental reasoning.<\/p>\n

    <\/a><\/a><\/a>6.3\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Distinctiveness of Transcendental Reasoning<\/h2>\n

    <\/a><\/a>6.3.1\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Conclusion is a Transcendental<\/em><\/h3>\n

    One of the distinctives of transcendental argumentation is that the conclusion of a transcendental argument is not a conclusion about a specific fact of reality but rather a transcendental<\/em>, that which is assumed to make the argument or the interpretation and evaluation of any other fact of reality intelligible at all:<\/p>\n

    \u201c[Transcendental argumentation] would serve\u2026to purge\u2026our reason [and] would guard reason against errors.\u00a0 I call all knowledge transcendental<\/strong> which deals not so much with objects as with our manner of knowing objects insofar as this manner is to be possible a priori\u2026<\/em>\u201d.<\/a>[771]<\/a><\/p>\n

    The same does not apply for inductive, abductive, or deductive reasoning \u2013 the conclusions of the individual arguments do not form a category in themselves, they are just said to indicate some fact (in the case of deductive arguments), the best explanation (in the case of abductive arguments) or a generalised principle from experience (in the case of inductive arguments) about nature.\u00a0 It is a given of the deductive or inductive argument that the conclusions are derivative in character, whereas with a transcendental argument, premise and conclusion are involved in one another:<\/p>\n

    \u201c[The transcendental argument] has the peculiar property that it renders it own proof namely, experience, first of all possible, and that it has always to be presupposed in experience\u201d.<\/a>[772]<\/a><\/p>\n

    <\/a><\/a>6.3.2\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 All Reasoning Is Circular Reasoning<\/h3>\n

    The last sentence here is of particular importance \u2013 the very act of reasoning must assume that reason is itself reasonable<\/em>, i.e., that there is a rational basis for reason.\u00a0 As we argued previously, when understood in this way, any<\/em> rational argument is circular.\u00a0 Rather ironically, it may be precisely this implicit circularity that an informed sceptic wishes to establish in their argumentation, but transcendental reasoning renders this a non-sequitur<\/em>. Transcendental reasoning alone seeks to mute the sceptic on this point by demonstrating that the attempting of a sceptical argument is incoherent because it is assuming the coherence of reason whilst arguing there can be no basis for its coherence.<\/p>\n

    <\/a><\/a>6.3.3\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Scope of the Argument<\/h3>\n

    The scope<\/em> of the argument is another important principle in establishing the distinctive character of transcendental arguments.\u00a0 Some simple or trivial formulations with a limited scope might have the formal structure of a transcendental argument (we might call it a transcendentally framed statement<\/em>) and be amenable to \u201crhetorical (re-)phrasing\u201d<\/em> as inductive or deductive constructions but these are then seen to not fulfil the full criteria of being a transcendental argument<\/em>.<\/a>[773]<\/a>\u00a0 That is, the scope<\/em> of the argument is determinative in whether an argument is to be considered as truly<\/em> transcendental.\u00a0 The broader the scope of the terms and the implications of the conclusion, the more authentically transcendental it is.\u00a0 Only when understood in this way as arguments of broad scope yielding a conclusion which is a transcendental, are such arguments a distinct category from inductive, deductive, pragmatic, or abductive argument.<\/p>\n

    So, for example, P F Strawson\u2019s famous transcendental argument in Individuals<\/em> seeks to establish that conceptually<\/em> we assume the persistence of objects in a spatial-temporal relation:<\/p>\n

    \u201cThere is no doubt that we have the idea of a single\u00a0spatio-temporal system of material things; the idea of every material thing at any time being spatially related, in various ways at various times, to every other at every time.\u00a0\u00a0There is no doubt at all that this\u00a0is<\/em>\u00a0our conceptual scheme.\u00a0\u00a0Now I say that a\u00a0condition<\/em>\u00a0of our having this conceptual scheme is the unquestioning acceptance of particular-identity in at least some cases of non-continuous observation\u201d.<\/a>[774]<\/a><\/p>\n

    The argument is not<\/em> that in any one individual case we guarantee the persistence of the objects when they are unperceived \u2013 it is perfectly possible that someone wishing to refute the thesis arranges for the swapping of items in a room with similar ones whilst we sleep.\u00a0 It is rather that the general principle<\/em> of the conceptual<\/em> persistence of distinct objects over time whilst unperceived must<\/em> be assumed by the sceptic who seeks to frame an argument that denies the persistence of unperceived objects.\u00a0 It is not for us to argue here whether Strawson was successful, but merely to point out this argument is designed to establish our conceptual belief that objects continue to exist over time, a non-specific, generally applicable conclusion.<\/p>\n

    This would be in contrast to the \u201cpolar case\u201d arguments associated with Austin, Ryle and others, sometimes in what is called the \u2018Oxford School\u2019. <\/a>[775]<\/a>\u00a0 Butler summarises this well:<\/p>\n

    \u201c[Transcendental Arguments] should not be confused with paradigm-case and\/or polar concept arguments\u2026For while these types of arguments share a similar form with TAs, they differ greatly in the type of conclusion that is inferred\u2026A brief comparison should bring out this distinction.\u00a0\u00a0Austin argues that the skeptic’s appeal to illusion does not work because the term ‘illusion’ makes sense only in a context of having some real things to compare with it and thus everything could not be an illusion (or better put, it makes no sense to say everything is an illusion).\u201d<\/p>\n

    Now, we can immediately recognise the \u201ctranscendental\u201d form, in that Austin was arguing the concept of illusion assumes the \u201creal\u201d; we would be tempted to say the \u2018\u201creal\u201d is a transcendental for \u201cillusion\u201d\u2019.\u00a0 However, the conclusion is narrow and does not significantly hinder the sceptic.\u00a0 Butler continues:<\/p>\n

    \u201cAssuming this argument works, the conclusion in somewhat parochial: it defeats only one particular skeptical challenge.\u00a0\u00a0The skeptic, though, can simply propose to toss away both words and offer a fresh challenge.\u00a0\u00a0A TA aims at something more cosmopolitan\u2026the difference between a TA and a polar concept argument is one of scope; the latter asks what are the necessary preconditions for the intelligible use of a small set of terms, the former is concerned with the use of a much larger set\u201d.<\/a>[776]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

    Thus, to further clarify this, if we were to be asking within what epistemological or metaphysical context does speaking about both \u201creal\u201d or \u201cillusion\u201d make sense or is intelligible, e.g., we are concluding that there is a world of external objects, identifying something about the nature of our mind and its relation to objects and identifying significant features of the mechanisms of perception; then we are arguing about fundamentals and preconditions of intelligibility that have a broad applicability.\u00a0 We could thus be sure we are dealing with a transcendental argument rather than just an argument of an analogous form<\/em>.<\/p>\n

    Thus, in summary, we are establishing that the transcendental argument not only has a logical structure but has a specific kind of semantic content.\u00a0 Of course, it would not be difficult to imagine cases which fall between the polar case and the transcendental proper, but that there is<\/em> a distinction is what is necessary for our purposes.\u00a0 When we consider Van Til\u2019s argument specifically, we should immediately recognise them as not just logically transcendental in form but semantically sufficient in content.<\/p>\n

    <\/a><\/a>6.3.4\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Kant Controversy<\/h3>\n

    Considering our definitional tension above, it is mindful that we do not get distracted by further pseudo-definitional controversies.\u00a0 Firstly, it is correct that the \u201cmodern\u201d transcendental argument is properly to be interpreted as broadening the Kantian designation.\u00a0 The broadening of the scope is most clearly seen in the light of the modern debate which was initiated by P.F Strawson\u2019s Individuals<\/em> and The Bounds of Sense<\/em>.\u00a0 Strawson was a neo-Kantian and modified Kant\u2019s transcendentalism to \u201cavoid the [problematic] doctrines of transcendental psychology\u201d<\/em> <\/a>[777]<\/a> and to purposefully avoid the problematic category of the synthetic a priori<\/em>.<\/p>\n

    However, some such as Hintikka directly challenged Strawson on this point (and the many others who were philosophically provoked by Strawson\u2019s posit), that their approach was not transcendental in the Kantian sense for:<\/p>\n

    \u201cThe references to the “psychological apparatus” which recent writers on transcendental arguments tend to dismiss as inessential are in fact close to the very gist of the Kantian arguments\u201d.<\/a>[778]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

    That is, as Hintikka correctly noted, Kant reserved the term \u201ctranscendental\u201d for the specific<\/em> arguments that demonstrated how the mind imposed its categories, its sensibilities, and its understanding on the objects of experience; that is, the process of the mind \u2018constructing knowledge\u2019 from phenomenal experience and giving it order, thus making that experience possible.\u00a0 He thus felt Strawson, Stroud and \u2018recent literature\u2019 had misunderstood the essence of the Kantian transcendental argument.\u00a0 However, the attack seems muddled as Hintikka then goes on to describe a feature of the \u201cauthentic\u201d transcendental argument:<\/p>\n

    \u201cThe conclusion (the possibility of certain conceptual practices) is arrived at by reasoning which itself relies on these practices. The conclusion makes possible the very argument by means of which it is established. [In this] we seem to have in it a much better example of what would be a transcendental argument in a genuinely Kantian sense\u201d. <\/a>[779]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

    This, of course, is precisely the essence of what Strawson, Stroud and the \u201cothers\u201d assumed in their arguments.\u00a0 For Strawson, the sceptic is disarmed because the sceptical conclusion can only be arrived at by reasoning that relies on a non-sceptical transcendental premise.\u00a0 Whilst conceding to Hintikka that there is indeed a difference in the sense Kant understood the term, it is possible to put the dispute to rest, at least in the sense of anything philosophically important, by considering that the very same logical form of argument that bear the modern nomenclature of transcendental argument are<\/em> Kantian arguments in the sense he employed them in the Critique<\/em> (in the \u2018second analogy\u2019 in the Refutation of Idealism). \u00a0The most we need concede is that Kant reserved the term transcendental<\/em> argument for arguments regarding the categories, the neo-Kantian does not and need not. <\/a>[780]<\/a>\u00a0 It should also be noted that Aristotle argued transcendentally in this sense for the law of excluded middle, so the form has a long pedigree independent of the modern debate.<\/p>\n

    That is, although there is an important technical sense in which modern transcendental arguments are distinct from Kantian transcendental arguments, just as modern neo-Darwinian arguments are distinct from Darwin\u2019s arguments, <\/a>[781]<\/a> it can be said that modern transcendental arguments, be they from Strawson, Wittgenstein,<\/a>[782]<\/a> Lewis <\/a>[783]<\/a> or Van Til,<\/a>[784]<\/a> are still \u2018transcendental\u2019 when understood in an analogous and widened sense in the context of Kant\u2019s critiques as a whole.<\/a>[785]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

    <\/a><\/a>6.3.5\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Option \u201cA\u201d and Option \u201cB\u201d Transcendental Arguments<\/h3>\n

    The most famous response to Strawson\u2019s seminal use of transcendental argumentation was that of Stroud.<\/a>[786]<\/a>\u00a0 In it he argued that the most transcendental arguments can do is to prove the necessity of certain concepts<\/em> for our understanding of the world (option \u201cA\u201d arguments), it does not mean that the world is actually<\/em> that way (option \u201cB\u201d arguments).\u00a0 That is, there is no ontological necessity associated with the transcendental argument.\u00a0 Stroud went on to argue that for transcendental arguments to bridge that gap, they would need to import in a form of verification principle which thus renders the transcendental move redundant.\u00a0 With verificationism dead and buried <\/a>[787]<\/a> fifteen years prior with Quine\u2019s critique of it, Stroud concluded the arguments were of no value in telling us the way the world really<\/em> is, and the metaphysical sceptic remains undefeated, though perhaps with a far weaker justification for their scepticism.<\/p>\n

    However, although Stroud\u2019s arguments were insightful, he seemed to misunderstand that Strawson was not<\/em> making an ontological claim.\u00a0 Strawson did not abandon transcendental argumentation in the wake of Stroud.\u00a0 In fact, he believed Stroud had radically misinterpreted what he himself was claiming for transcendental arguments.\u00a0 His interest was to demonstrate the interconnectedness of concepts as part of a \u201cdescriptive (as opposed to validatory or revisionary) metaphysics<\/em>\u201d.<\/a>[788]<\/a>\u00a0 He was notably unmoved by the persistence of sceptical doubt:<\/p>\n

    \u201c[T]he point has been, not to offer a rational justification of the belief in external objects and other minds or of the practice of induction, but to represent sceptical arguments and rational counter-arguments as equally idle \u2013 not senseless, but idle \u2013 since what we have here are original, natural, inescapable commitments which we neither choose nor could give up<\/em>. The further such commitment which I now suggest we should acknowledge is the commitment to belief in the reality and determinateness of the past\u201d.<\/a>[789]<\/a> (Emphasis added).<\/p>\n

    Here Strawson is making a conceptual version of Moore\u2019s appealing to what is obvious to my perception I am perfectly justified in believing in preference to your sceptical doubt, with no accommodation to the sceptic <\/a>[790]<\/a> viewing such doubt as \u201cidle\u201d and the evidentialist argument as equally idle.\u00a0 Just as Wittgenstein considered the proposition \u201cmy name is Ludwig Wittgenstein\u201d<\/em> as certain but ungrounded, so Strawson views the sceptical question. \u00a0That is, it does no useful work for us in relating to and living in the world, which in light of our discussion in previous sections, also finds resonance in Blackburn and Plantinga.<\/p>\n

    <\/a><\/a><\/a>6.4\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Van Til\u2019s Transcendentalism<\/h2>\n

    <\/a><\/a>6.4.1\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Presuppositional Apologetics<\/h3>\n

    In simple terms, Van Til\u2019s transcendentalism is captured in his famous aphorism, \u201catheism presupposes<\/em> theism\u201d.\u00a0 Now the \u201cpresupposes\u201d here is not merely a psychological or perceptual claim (an \u201coption \u2018A\u2019\u201d argument) but one which deals with the way the world really is (an \u201coption \u2018B\u2019\u201d argument).\u00a0 For Van Til, the transcendental argument is elevated to the worldview level, the whole account of nature and of supernature is laid as the bounds of the argument and the transcendental principle is deduced as the transcendent Trinity.\u00a0 Thus, the challenges of diversity and unity, of the one and the many, the particular and the universal are reconciled:<\/p>\n

    \u201cThe presuppositional challenge to the unbeliever is guided by the premise that only the Christian worldview provides the philosophical preconditions necessary for man\u2019s reasoning and knowledge in any field whatever<\/em>.\u00a0 This is what is meant by a \u201ctranscendental\u201d defense of Christianity\u2026From beginning to end, man\u2019s reasoning about anything whatever (even reasoning about reasoning itself) is unintelligible or incoherent unless<\/em> the truth<\/em> of the Christian scriptures is presupposed\u2026<\/em>\u201d.<\/a>[791]<\/sup><\/a> (Emphasis added).<\/p>\n

    Now this means for Van Til, that Stroud\u2019s criticism of the option \u201cB\u201d argument loses its teeth.\u00a0 The Christian worldview explicitly connects the world as perceived with the world as it really is.\u00a0 The scriptures provide the mandate for a regularity of nature (thus validating inductive science), the logos<\/em> for deductive and logical certainty and a pragmatic imperative for the solving human problems.\u00a0 Plantinga expresses this elegantly:<\/p>\n

    \u201cif we don\u2019t know that there is such a person as God<\/strong>, we don\u2019t know the first thing (the most important thing) about ourselves, each other, and our world\u2026the most important truths about us and them is that we have been created by the Lord and utterly depend on him for our continued existence\u2026we don\u2019t grasp the significance<\/strong> of\u2026human phenomena\u2026science, art, music, philosophy\u201d.<\/a>[792]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 (Emphasis added).<\/p>\n

    <\/a><\/a>6.4.2\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 From Probability to Certainty<\/h3>\n

    Van Til argued that the alternative models of reason, the inductive, deductive, abductive, pragmatic, and positivistic in all their variations and inflections, resolve to probabilities rather than certainty.\u00a0 He held that the challenge of Hume\u2019s deconstruction of empiricism and his denial of causality, forever remained an asymptotic limiting concept to secular reasoning and permitted irrefutable sceptical doubt.\u00a0 Only with the help of the TAG can this be defeated, and the alternative modes of reasoning legitimised.<\/p>\n

    This is an important principle to understand, we are seeking to validate all<\/em> forms of reason. \u00a0Certain modes of reasoning are more suited to different problems than other kinds of reasoning, e.g., we can never reason deductively to answer the question whether it is raining (though we could argue inductively on the basis of air pressure, windspeed, humidity etc.), it must be settled with an empirical operation.<\/p>\n

    <\/a><\/a>6.4.3\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Indirect Argumentation<\/h3>\n

    When we have an argument over any feature of nature and share common presuppositions then appeal can be made to the legitimising authority to resolve a dispute.\u00a0 For example, two botanists in a dispute over a particular genus can refer to their common taxonomical authority, follow an agreed procedure and settle the dispute.\u00a0 This is an example of a direct<\/em> argument where the facts can be established because there is a common philosophy<\/em> of facts<\/em> between the parties.\u00a0 However, when common presuppositions are not shared, i.e., our accounts of nature are different, when our \u201cconceptual schemes\u201d or \u201cworldviews\u201d are in conflict, our philosophy of facts differ; when there are competing a priori<\/em> conceptions or \u201cincommensurate paradigms\u201d <\/em><\/a>[793]<\/a>, then it is not possible to settle the argument directly.<\/p>\n

    Some believe that there is some kind of philosophical stand-off in this situation and that no reasoning is possible between the competing parties.\u00a0 We saw what Wittgenstein called a \u201cform of life\u201d and the language game can only be understood from within that community. \u00a0Each community is self-validating, and neither can dismiss the other. \u00a0Van Til was frequently accused <\/a>[794]<\/a> by critics of this position which might also be called fideism.<\/a>[795]<\/a>\u00a0 However, such a criticism of Van Til totally misconstrues the transcendental nature of his reasoning.\u00a0 Transcendental reasoning allows for the assessment of the truth claim of a worldview by subjecting the opposing positions to an internal critique on their own<\/em> terms and\/or demonstrating the impossibility of the contrary view to the Christian view.<\/p>\n

    As we have seen, with Van Tillian logic, there are only two worldviews \u2013 the Christian<\/em> and the non\u00ad-<\/em>Christian.\u00a0 \u00a0The Christian<\/em> worldview starts from the presupposition of the transcendent God who reveals Himself in the scriptures with the mind of the human subject derivative in its reasoning and subject to divine authority and sanction.\u00a0 The non-<\/em>Christian worldview asserts the autonomy of human thought.\u00a0 Thus, although there are apparently incommensurate non-Christian worldviews, they are variations on the same basic presupposition of the autonomous status of the human mind \u2013 seen most obviously in the varieties of naturalism.<\/p>\n

    It is not possible to settle the differences directly but by arguing that denying the Christian presupposition renders reality unintelligible, it refutes the non-Christian worldview in all<\/em> its inflections.\u00a0 We are not arguing directly over some \u201cfact\u201d of nature but indirectly regarding the very structure of the thought that renders it intelligible.\u00a0 The unique logical structure of transcendental argument is that we can start with p<\/em> or ~p (where p<\/em> is any fact of the universe as a premise) and demonstrate the transcendental necessity of our presupposition.\u00a0 This is not the case with inductive or deductive arguments, you refute a premise, it invalidates the conclusion.\u00a0 Kant implies this when he asserts the transcendental makes possible the ground for its own proof and is assumed as we are arguing for that very same transcendental.<\/p>\n

    What makes Van Tillian argument distinctive is that he broadens the transcendental argument to not just a conceptual scheme, but the worldview<\/em> level.\u00a0 The argument is simple, only<\/em> the Christian worldview<\/em> makes human predication possible.\u00a0 For Van Til, human predication <\/em><\/a>[796]<\/a> is concrete and not abstract reasoning <\/a>[797]<\/a>, by which we mean the mind of God establishes the coherence between and the correspondence with the facts of the world.\u00a0 This sets it apart from the transcendental deductions of the categories of understanding in Kant <\/a>[798]<\/a>, the cogito<\/em> of Descartes <\/a>[799]<\/a> or the modalism of Dooyeweerd.<\/a>[800]<\/a>\u00a0 Van Til maintains that their critiques fail because they seek only to establish transcendentally a principle, but a further transcendental proof would then be required to ground<\/em> the transcendentals themselves.<\/a>[801]<\/a>\u00a0 In essence, Van Til starts his transcendental reasoning with God, God does not earn his place at the philosophical table after the autonomous mind of humanity has validated the legitimacy of his presence.<\/p>\n

    <\/a><\/a><\/a>6.5\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Criticisms of TAG<\/h2>\n

    <\/a><\/a>6.5.1\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Global Criticisms of Transcendentalism<\/h3>\n

    It would be amiss of us to ignore the controversial history of modern transcendentalism before we consider the possible criticisms of TAG specifically, for TAG is a specialisation of the category.\u00a0 If the category is unsafe, then TAG is moot.\u00a0 It is not our intention here to rehearse these arguments in their agonising detail, but rather to offer a high-level survey that demonstrates the plausibility of the category can be maintained despite these criticisms.<\/a>[802]<\/a>\u00a0 The justification for such a brief examination is threefold in addition to the obvious one of our limited space:<\/p>\n

      \n
    1. Van Tillian transcendentalism as presented above offers a very clear argument, the force of which it is not difficult to appreciate.\u00a0 Criticisms of TAG are often more specific to TAG rather than the general criticisms of transcendentalism.<\/li>\n
    2. Much of the dispute over transcendentalism appears linguistic rather than substantive.<\/li>\n
    3. Others have made it the central focus of their advanced studies <\/a>[803]<\/a> and we have the benefit of summarising the main conclusions of their work.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      The most trenchant criticisms were found in Gram\u2019s paper where he denied the category in its entirety.<\/a>[804]<\/a>\u00a0 However, he received a strong response from Hintikka who was keen to clarify what precisely a transcendental argument was as some confusion <\/a>[805]<\/a> had arisen in the literature as reflected in Gram\u2019s \u2018paradigm case\u2019 <\/a>[806]<\/a> in that paper. \u00a0He then \u201ccorrected\u201d Gram in the most explicit way by re-positing the \u2018proper\u2019 category in its pure Kantian sense, receiving equally vigorous ripostes from Gram.<\/a>[807]<\/a>\u00a0 Leaving out the details <\/a>[808]<\/a>, it would seem Hintikka had<\/em> established criteria sufficiently persuasive against the transcendental scepticism of Gram which would arguably distinguish a space for a transcendental method<\/em>,<\/a>[809]<\/a> if not the category.<\/p>\n

      However, alongside this vexed technical dispute there were notable philosophers such as Grayling and McDowell <\/a>[810]<\/a> making influential and extensive use of a transcendental approach and as Butler notes, Frege, Wittgenstein, Davidson, Putnum and Searle had all employed the mode of argumentation. <\/a>[811]<\/a> \u00a0It would thus seem the ground is firm enough beneath transcendental arguments that we can acknowledge them as valid, the specific issues of dispute are more related to the domain of their application rather than a foundational invalidation.\u00a0 Further, as I noted it introducing this section, it is not<\/em> unclear as to what the Van Tillian transcendental argument claims, even if it is denied that it is an effective argument. \u00a0It should be immediately admitted that Van Til\u2019s argument is breathtaking in its ambition and perspicuous in its simplicity.<\/a>[812]<\/a>\u00a0 It is an eminently accessible statement of revolutionary apologetic principles, but as Butler notes, \u201cHe was content to present the argument in broad strokes and leave the details aside\u2026he left the detailed work to his followers\u201d<\/em>.<\/a>[813]<\/a>\u00a0 Inevitably, the brevity of presentation, the revolutionary character and his lack of a defence meant the attacks levied against it were many and furious from his opponents,<\/a>[814]<\/a> it is to them we turn and assess whether the argument can withstand them.<\/p>\n

      <\/a><\/a>6.5.2\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Nature of TAG<\/h3>\n

      One criticism <\/a>[815]<\/a>, particularly associated with \u2018Van Tillian\u2019 <\/a>[816]<\/a> John Frame, is that TAG is not a unique argument form, rather it is merely a rhetorical method <\/a>[817]<\/a> and can be reduced to the more traditional arguments for God\u2019s existence as found in Aquinas, particularly the cosmological and teleological arguments which argue from design and causality to God.<\/a>[818]<\/a> \u00a0However, there is a basic misunderstanding demonstrated by Frame here.\u00a0 The unbeliever has no right to even formulate the concept of causality<\/em> in the autonomous fashion that the traditional arguments employ.\u00a0 Van Til\u2019s position is that the concept of causality would not be intelligible as a standalone concept without the ontological Trinity to provide the transcendent basis of the transcendental. \u00a0As Butler notes:<\/p>\n

      \u201c[Traditional cosmological arguments assume] that the non-believer is perfectly justified in believing in causation and\/or using the concept of causation.\u00a0 Indeed, it assumes that human experience and understanding in general and causation in particular are perfectly intelligible outside the Christian worldview\u201d.<\/a>[819]<\/a><\/p>\n

      In contrast, a transcendental<\/em> argument demonstrates the necessity of the concept by the impossibility of the opposite, not by a direct inference about cause itself, as seen in the traditional arguments.\u00a0 At best, the traditional argument might be seen within the believing community<\/em> as concluding that God is the transcendent<\/em> cause of the Universe, but equally for the unbeliever it might just demonstrate some \u201ctranscendental\u201d that fits into a deterministic view of \u201cnature\u201d. \u00a0Thus, this is very different from proving the existence of God is transcendentally <\/em>necessary, the ground for all being and for the intelligibility of nature <\/a>[820]<\/a> and thus Frame\u2019s contention is unsound.<\/p>\n

      <\/a><\/a>6.5.3\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Uniqueness Proof<\/h3>\n

      By this, what is meant is that Christianity might be proved by TAG as being a sufficient<\/em> condition to satisfy the premise of human experience and intelligibility of that experience, but it has not been demonstrated that it is a necessary<\/em> one.\u00a0 Most commonly, this is asserted that there may be a worldview \u2018X\u2019 that may or may not have been discovered that might also provide the conditions of intelligibility.\u00a0 Thus, it can never<\/em> be established that Christianity is the only<\/em> instantiation fulfilling the premises or that it will remain so.<\/p>\n

      This contention, however, misunderstands the nature of transcendental proof which is not localised to a particular worldview.\u00a0 From the point of view of TAG internally, this is not problematic as for TAG there are only two possible worldviews, the Christian, or the non-Christian.\u00a0 If any non-Christian view is refuted, then all<\/em> are refuted, the Christian is by default correct (what is termed a disjunctive syllogism).<\/p>\n

      <\/a><\/a>6.5.4\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Mere Sufficiency of the Christian Worldview<\/h3>\n

      This is really a special case of the previous objection.\u00a0 If the critic asserts, we have a simple disjunction (A or B or \u2026. N), it no longer holds that given ~B (or ~C\u2026~N) we have A.\u00a0 Any of the alternatives will present a sufficient worldview, including the Christian one, but not a necessary<\/em> one.<\/p>\n

      However, as with the uniqueness objection, this misses the crucial issue regarding transcendental argumentation. \u00a0It is not arguing about refuting a specific instantiation of the class \u201cnon-Christian worldview\u201d but rather the conceptual validity of the non-Christian worldview type<\/em> that provides the template for that class.<\/a>[821]<\/a> \u00a0There really are<\/em> only two possible worldviews, to refute one variation of the non-Christian worldview is to refute them all because the presuppositions are common even if the details are different.\u00a0 Even the radical relativist who appeals that there could<\/em> be a possible world or conceptual scheme so different from our own which will someday<\/em> satisfy the criteria for intelligibility can be answered.\u00a0 Donald Davidson in an epoch-making paper <\/a>[822]<\/a> demonstrated that it makes no sense<\/em> to talk about a conceptual scheme different<\/em> from our own, to be recognised<\/em> as a conceptual scheme is<\/em> to be part of our conceptual scheme.<\/p>\n

      This we must recognise as an epistemological<\/em> point though, as Christians we understand that God\u2019s conceptual scheme is<\/em> different from our own.<\/a>[823]<\/a>\u00a0 There may be other conceptual schemes, it is just we can have no knowledge regarding them unless that knowledge is provided providentially and intersects with our own conceptual scheme.\u00a0 This objection thus migrates into how the bridge between conceptual necessity and ontological necessity is bridged, which we will consider shortly.<\/p>\n

      <\/a><\/a>6.5.5\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The \u2018Fristianity\u2019 Objection<\/h3>\n

      In this case, the Christian worldview is modified on one single point, or an adjunct or revision is made and a new religion, \u201cFristianity\u201d we will call it, is born with its unique theology. \u00a0This is another special case of the uniqueness objection that argues that the objection is not just conceivable but instantiated<\/em> in the denominational variations amongst Christian believers.<\/p>\n

      Now, as Butler notes, this objection is unproblematic in the case of the modification of the major doctrines of Christianity.\u00a0 This is because the major doctrines of Christianity are a unified whole, a transcendental unity guaranteed by a transcendent triune Being.\u00a0 You cannot modify one, e.g., turning the Trinity into a Quadrinity <\/a>[824]<\/a> or collapsing it into a unity,<\/a>[825]<\/a> without changing its very nature.\u00a0 However, what if we just change one detail, or issue some counterfactual challenge, e.g., regarding the canonicity of certain books?\u00a0 Now, this is easily countered because the change is not a relevant<\/em> change to the worldview, some Christian communities indeed maintain a genuine Christian commitment with differences to their canons.<\/p>\n

      However, more fundamentally as a basic feature of a Christian philosophy, the Christian \u201cconceptual scheme\u201d is a subset<\/em> of the \u201cChristian worldview\u201d. \u00a0The Christian experience shares a phenomenology that supports a cultural diversity, for the scriptures were presented by God to Humanity as narrative (rather than as a systematic theology).\u00a0 There is freedom and liberty to express the creativity of God that allows for contingency, choice, and variety. \u00a0The Christian community was maintained for centuries when people were unable to read or when the Papists controlled society and the church.\u00a0 It was not merely a conceptual scheme but a rich phenomenology of Christian life.<\/a>[826]<\/a>\u00a0 In contrast, all that the Christian worldview need posit in conceptual and theological terms, is the salvation of humanity through the substitutionary work of Christ, which is the call for all to repent and to be reconciled to God.<\/p>\n

      <\/a><\/a>6.5.6\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 From Conceptual Necessity to Ontological Necessity<\/h3>\n

      Of all the objections to TAG, this objection is the most serious and draws its strength from the very nature of transcendental arguments.\u00a0 As Butler notes there is a paucity of response in the positive literature regarding TAG to this objection.\u00a0 Stroud <\/a>[827]<\/a> was the most famous expositor of this criticism:<\/p>\n

      \u201cThe conditions for anything\u2019s making sense would have to be strong enough to include not only<\/em> our beliefs about what is the case, but also<\/em> the possibility of our knowing whether those beliefs are true<\/em>\u2026But to prove this would be to prove some version of the verification principle, and then the skeptic will have been directly and conclusively refuted\u201d. <\/a>[828]<\/a> (Emphasis added).<\/p>\n

      In other words, this is the connection of how we must conceive of the world with the way the world really is.\u00a0 There is a clear distinction between perceiving the world a certain way and the way the world really is.<\/a>[829]<\/a>\u00a0 Stroud asserted that the transcendental method had to import in some form of verification principle to bridge that gap, but if that were the case, the transcendental argument is redundant.\u00a0 This is because the verification principle immediately draws that connection.\u00a0 However, we have already seen that the verification principle is self-refuting, it is not established on the basis of empirical evidence but is a rational, metaphysical premise, and following Quine, dogmatically assumed within the empiricist mode of thought.<\/p>\n

      Thus, Butler notes, \u201call that is proven [by TAG if the objection stands] is that in order to be rational, we must believe that God exists\u201d<\/em> which is conceptually different than proving God actually<\/em> exists. \u00a0Now, of course, if we were simply concerned with apologetics, the rational defence<\/em> of Christianity against its detractors, we might consider the apologetic task complete and the criticism irrelevant.\u00a0 Butler thus continues:<\/p>\n

      \u201cThis defense carries a great deal of force.\u00a0 It effectively undermines the unbeliever\u2019s ability to rationally reject the Christian faith.\u00a0 But notice that this defense construes TAG not so much as a proof for God\u2019s existence but, rather, as a proof for the necessity of believing the Christian worldview\u201d.<\/p>\n

      Butler\u2019s next remarks are telling for they are exactly where Plantinga left off and that would imply Van Til and Plantinga have the same terminus:<\/p>\n

      \u201cThe problem with this\u2026is that although Christianity may be the necessary precondition for experience, it does not follow from this that Christianity is true<\/em>\u201d.<\/a>[830]<\/a> (Emphasis added).<\/p>\n

      We remember that Plantinga believed it to it be true and maximally so but noted he was speaking personally and did not believe philosophy had the tools to establish its truth.<\/a>[831]<\/a>\u00a0 Our very justification for moving to a Van Tillian conception was to demonstrate its truth could<\/em> be established transcendentally.\u00a0 Without this connection, the sceptic might be perfectly happy to assert that they accept an amoral and irrational world without essences or metanarratives, and our previous discussion of postmodernism demonstrated there were plenty that are now content to be paralogical and consider reality a random, disconnected multiverse.\u00a0 We would have then catastrophically failed in the epistemologically self-consciousness project.<\/p>\n

      Now Butler can only make a theological move at this point to propose a resolution to this issue.\u00a0 He proposes that TAG as presented in our analysis thus far has been equated with \u201cconceptual scheme\u201d.\u00a0 This, he contends is a serious error as:<\/p>\n

      \u201cChristianity provides us with a detailed metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical system.\u00a0 The foundation of this system is an absolute personal God\u2026<\/em>This God is\u2026a speaking God who reveals truths to us about Himself and the world\u201d.<\/a>[832]<\/a><\/p>\n

      Now, we might be uncomfortable with this move as it would seem to be begging the question for the non-Christian, but it is certainly a reasonable one for the Christian. \u00a0We have already established that ultimate authorities will<\/em> beg the question.\u00a0 We understand that God has given us perception and faculties that teach us about the way the world is and how it works.\u00a0 We accept the testimony of scripture and its normative statements.\u00a0 However, I would argue that Butler\u2019s terminus here is then effectively equivalent to Plantinga\u2019s, we have made recourse to a Christian version of reliabilism.<\/p>\n

      However, before we cede this an issue of faith and capitulate afresh to what Kant called the scandal of philosophy, Baird offered a resolution that does not require a theological move but was based on a philosophical disarming of the Stroudian critique.\u00a0 Recollect that Stroud asserted the primary problem was bridging the gap between concept and reality, for a transcendental argument to do so would require the reliance on or the importing of the verificationist premise.\u00a0 Baird argues <\/a>[833]<\/a> that McDowell in his Mind and World<\/em> constructed a transcendental argument that justifies the verificationist principle.\u00a0 McDowell was looking to complete the Kantian task and was arguing what the presuppositions of empirical experience and objectivity must be and he is alleged to have established it transcendentally.\u00a0 Leaving out the details, it certainly seems a fair reading of McDowell that he has a principal aim of collapsing the distance between mind and world to justify empirical experience, and in doing so the verificationist principle is no longer seen as self-refuting.<\/a>[834]<\/a><\/p>\n

      Baird also notes that a worldview is assessed not just on coherence of conceptual scheme but on pragmatic criteria as to how well our theory works in the world; or why<\/em> some approaches work better than others.\u00a0 This bridge between pragmatic utility and truth is not dismissed as unimportant as in pragmatism but is seen to be the domain of metaphysics.\u00a0 Self-evidentially, for the believer, this correlates to the wider components of the Christian worldview that complete this connection.\u00a0 Thus, if Baird is correct, we can indeed make the connection between concept and world in a rather unexpected manner.\u00a0 In the strong philosophical sense, the separation between mind and world evaporates <\/a>[835]<\/a> and in the \u2018weaker\u2019 (but equally significant) theological sense, the Christian metaphysic is validated and indeed mandated.<\/p>\n

      <\/a><\/a><\/a>6.6\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Summary and Conclusion<\/h2>\n

      In this chapter we were interested in a formal understanding of the transcendental mode of argumentation as it had become of central importance to the arguments we were making through the thesis.\u00a0 By improving our formal understanding of the category, we could then go onto to consider its applicability more precisely and then consider more effectively the criticisms which have been levelled against it. \u00a0We understood first that it had a distinctive logical form which has a long history in Western philosophy from Aristotle and has been of particular interest to those philosophers dealing with the problem of scepticism; the transcendentalist argues that the sceptic\u2019s challenge is incoherent because they are assuming in the logic of their sceptical challenge what they seeking to dismiss.\u00a0 We noted that in the modern period, Kant in the 18th<\/sup> century and Strawson in the 20th<\/sup> century, understood the category in terms of demonstrating the necessity of certain conceptual constructions that framed our understanding of the world which could not legitimately be denied.<\/p>\n

      We noted that for Kant a transcendental argument was concerned with how it was possible a priori<\/em> to have a knowledge of any object and to build a synthetic<\/em> a priori<\/em> understanding and description of the phenomenal world, rather than with merely a purely empirical or rational account of it. \u00a0The conclusion of a transcendental argument is thus not a particular fact about reality or a generalised principle from experience but a concept.\u00a0 We found that one of the distinguishing features is that necessarily the premise and conclusion are involved in one another; there is a conceptual difference between the fallacy of circularity and the circularity implicit when arguing transcendentally, to argue regarding ultimate authorities must necessarily imply their use for there can be no reference to an external authority as that would then be more ultimate.\u00a0 In this respect, we needed to draw a distinction between transcendentally framed statements, which some have argued might be recast as either inductive or deductive arguments and might thus be conceived as of denying the legitimacy of the transcendental category more generally, and the transcendental argument.\u00a0 We demonstrated that the transcendental argument has a non-parochial conclusion, it is broad principle whereas a polar case argument might be mitigated in a purely linguistic manner by picking a new word; the transcendental argument would rather seek to explicate just what is required or is assumed that rends the linguistic couplet coherent and intelligible.\u00a0 We could thus conclude that the transcendental argument does not have a logical form alone but a particular type of semantic content; this distinction is necessary to understand Van Til\u2019s appropriation and use of transcendental argumentation.<\/p>\n

      Further, owing to the force of the historical controversy in the post-WWII period when philosophers such as Wittgenstein and Strawson had begun making use of transcendental argumentation, we noted the dispute amongst the neo-Kantians regarding the propriety of using the designation outside the strict Kantian sense.\u00a0 We concluded that there was nothing of philosophical importance in the dispute, noting that the central conception of what was required to make reasoning intelligible was preserved in the modern understanding; we noted that it was commonplace for categories to expand from their original meanings even to cases where the new meaning was in near contradiction to the original meaning, citing the substantive differences between classical and Neo-Darwinism.\u00a0 We concluded that because Kant did indeed employ an identical argument form to the modern form in the Second Refutation of Idealism, the most that could be claimed was a degree of confusion in the modern literature as for what context Kant had reserved the term \u2018transcendental\u2019; most precisely, modern transcendental arguments were Kantian arguments but not Kantian transcendental<\/em> arguments.<\/p>\n

      Accepting the broadened sense, we then examined the most important distinction in the classes of transcendental arguments, that between the Option \u201cA\u201d and the Option \u201cB\u201d designations.\u00a0 Option \u201cA\u201d arguments are said to demonstrate merely the necessity of certain concepts for our understanding of the world; Option \u201cB\u201d arguments were said to have had ontological force; they are not merely describing how we need to think about the world but are arguing that the world is necessarily what the argument demonstrates.\u00a0 We examined Stroud\u2019s claim that transcendental arguments can never bridge the gap to ontological claims without importing in a verification principle which would then have rendered the transcendental move moot.\u00a0 We concluded that Stroud seemed to have misunderstood Strawson on this point for Strawson was interested in descriptive metaphysics and was not making an ontological claim; he had asserted that arguments and counterarguments regarding necessary<\/em> commitments did no useful philosophical work for us; commitments can be certain but ungrounded.<\/p>\n

      We then proceeded to examine Van Til\u2019s variation of transcendentalism known as presuppositional apologetics; Van Til avoided the Stroudian dilemma by using the concept of the Christian worldview which explicitly connected our concepts about the world with the way the world really is.\u00a0 He argued that reasoning necessarily assumes the truth of the Christian worldview for intelligibility and coherence and that inductive science is validated because within our worldview God\u2019s Providence guarantees the principle, escaping the scepticism of Hume regarding reason.\u00a0 We fully recognised that alternative worldviews have an implicit circularity and can only be judged for transcendental coherence by undergoing an internal critique; that is, their claims are tested on their own terms.\u00a0 We found that this avoided the accusation of fideism for Van Til as only a single view, the Christian worldview, maintained its claims on a rational basis without incoherence; only in the Christian worldview where the transcendent Trinity provides the basis for transcendental logic, are the transcendental principles themselves grounded, otherwise the principles would be arbitrary and defeasible.\u00a0 We noted that Van Til asserted the unifying feature amongst disparate and incommensurable non-Christian worldviews was their assertion of their intellectual self-sufficiency, the autonomy of the human mind as the final judge and arbiter.\u00a0 This distinguished the transcendentalism of Van Til from that of Kant, Descartes and Dooyeweerd.<\/p>\n

      We then examined the general criticisms of transcendentalism which had come to focus in the lengthy and intense debate between Hintikka and Gram; we concluded that Hintikka had established the legitimacy of methodological transcendentalism, even if the category was vulnerable to criticisms.\u00a0 We noted that Grayling, McDowell, Frege, Wittgenstein, Davidson, Putnam, and Searle had all made use of transcendental argumentation in spite of the denial of its legitimacy; we thus concluded that it has sufficient cogency as a philosophical method.\u00a0 We then proceeded to examine the specific criticisms levelled against Van Tillian transcendentalism which were judged on most occasions to be erroneous because of an inadequate understanding of the nature of the transcendental claim as having a distinct, categorical nature; we made use of our previous work which demonstrated that rhetorical rephrasing in inductive or deductive terms was only possible for arguments that were not sufficiently broad to be considered transcendental arguments as opposed to transcendentally framed statements.\u00a0 Other criticisms failed to appreciate the disjunctive nature of the Van Tillian claim, there are only two worldviews, the Christian and the non-Christian; in refuting any one claim within any non-Christian worldview, all are refuted.\u00a0 We noted that Davidson\u2019s argument regarding the impossibility of being able to recognise a conceptual scheme different from our own was basic in this regard with the important qualification that Davidson\u2019s point was strictly epistemological; there might indeed be different conceptual schemes, but we would not be able to recognise them.\u00a0 We then examined one of the more theological criticisms that attempted to assert we could keep the substance of the Christian worldview but only change it on a single point; however, we noted that the core and basic Christian beliefs were a unified whole and a transcendental unity, you could not change one without changing the essence of the position.<\/p>\n

      Lastly, we considered the most challenging objection to the transcendental thesis, that of bridging the gap between conceptual necessity and ontological necessity; there is a clear philosophical distinction between perceiving or conceptualising the world in a particular way and the world really being that way.\u00a0 Unless that gap can be bridged, we noted that the most that could be claimed was that TAG established the necessity of believing the Christian worldview to make reality intelligible but not that belief in the Christian God was logically necessary for intelligibility. \u00a0Stroud argued that this could only be bridged by a verification principle which would then invalidate the argument as we had previously concluded that a verificationist principle can never justify itself on its own criteria.\u00a0 We noted that Butler obviated this objection by asserting that TAG had been misconstrued as a conceptual scheme, rather than as a worldview which had built-in ontological commitments, thus circumventing the abstract objection.\u00a0 We considered this a satisfactory terminus for the Christian but argued further that McDowell\u2019s justification of the verification principle on a transcendental basis might also mute Stroud\u2019s objection, lending greater force to the proof for non-believers; we also found that others argued that because some approaches to the world work better than others, this implies metaphysical analysis and conclusions were possible.\u00a0 Thus, as our aim was to establish not just the probability of the Christian worldview but the necessity of it, we have arguably found a transcendental formulation which demonstrates how this gap can be plausibly bridged.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[763]<\/a> Stern, R., 2020. Transcendental Arguments. <\/em>[Online] Available at: https:\/\/plato.stanford.edu\/entries\/transcendental-arguments\/<\/a>, <\/u>[Accessed 15 July 2021], sec.2.2.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[764]<\/a> Aristotle, Metaphysics<\/em>\u00a01005b35\u20131006a28.\u00a0 Competent editions of Aristotle\u2019s work (e.g., as listed in the Bibliography) will have references to the positions within the original manuscripts to which these numbers refer.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[765]<\/a> A similar argument may be had to those worldviews that offer a mitigated account of reason or ascribe it a subsidiary role.\u00a0 To the degree that the role and power of reason is mitigated in those systems is the degree to which we need not be bound by their conclusions.\u00a0 Whilst we are not so foolish as to claim an \u201cabsolute\u201d power of reason in the human subject, we are claiming an absolute principle of reason capable of being understood by the human subject; that is, the transcendent transcendental revealed to us within scripture.\u00a0 That provides us the confidence that we have access to the Truth, both in a metaphysical, experiential sense encompassing our religious experience and the epistemological sense for living in the world, though these two are intimately involved in one another.\u00a0 For the latter, epistemological sense, that is reflected and made evident in our derivative reasonings which may legitimately be subject to detailed exposition, refinement, or falsification.\u00a0 We can be certain with regards to the Truth but fallible in our understanding and application of it.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[766]<\/a> Wittgenstein in his Investigations<\/em> has much to say regarding the role of \u201crules\u201d in philosophical discussion.\u00a0 In the Revised Fourth Edition the index entry for \u201crules\u201d is exceptional as is the indexing of the volume generally.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[767]<\/a> Bahnsen, G., 1995. Four Types of Proof. <\/em>[Sound Recording] (Covenant Media Foundation)<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[768]<\/a> Generally accepted to have begun with the publication of P F Strawson\u2019s Individuals<\/em> (1959) from which time they became a \u201cprominent fixture in contemporary philosophy\u201d<\/em> (Butler (2002), p.90).<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[769]<\/a> Kant, I. (2007 (1781\/1787)). Critique of Pure Reason<\/em> (2nd ed.). (M. Weigelt, Ed., & M. M\u00fcller, Trans.) London: Penguin., Bxl (footnote).<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[770]<\/a> K\u00f6rner, S., 1979 (1969). Fundamental questions in philosophy. <\/em>Harmondsworth: Penguin. p.xi.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[771]<\/a> Kant, I., 2007 (1781\/1787). Critique of Pure Reason. <\/em>2nd ed. London: Penguin. p52 (A11-12).<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[772]<\/a> Kant, I., 2007 (1781\/1787). Critique of Pure Reason. <\/em>2nd ed. London: Penguin. p592 (A737|B765)<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[773]<\/a> Bahnsen, G., 1998. Van Til’s Apologetic – Readings and Analysis. <\/em>Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing. p500.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[774]<\/a> Strawson, P., 2001 (1959). Individuals – An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. <\/em>Kindle (1st) ed. London: Routledge. p.35<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[775]<\/a> However, Austin undoubtedly interacted with Wittgenstein\u2019s use of transcendental logic.\u00a0 For an introduction to J.L. Austin and the \u201cordinary language\u201d school, see Longworth (2021).<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[776]<\/a> Butler, M., nd.. The Transcendental Argument for God’s Existence. <\/em>[Online] Available at: http:\/\/www.butler-harris.org\/tag\/<\/a> [Accessed 26 08 2021].<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[777]<\/a> Strawson, P., 1966. The bounds of sense: An essay on Kant\u2019s \u2018Critique of pure reason. <\/em>London: Methuen., p.97<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[778]<\/a> Hintikka, J., 1972. Transcendental Arguments: Genuine and Spurious. No\u00fbs, <\/em>6(3), p. 276.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[779]<\/a> Hintikka, J., 1972. Transcendental Arguments: Genuine and Spurious. No\u00fbs, <\/em>6(3), p. 278.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[780]<\/a> Thus, we are justified in using the term in this broader sense, excepting there is a stricter technical sense perhaps more directly related to the Kantian categories (often found in post-Heideggerian existentialist scholarship).<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[781]<\/a> In fact, modern \u201cDarwinian\u201d arguments are predicated on a different basis all together.\u00a0 \u201cNatural Selection\u201d is not the<\/em> mechanism for evolutionary change and the radically different \u201cDarwinian\u201d models proposed to replace it proved an explosive debate between the rival evolutionist camps, see Sterelny (2007). \u00a0To my understanding, this is a continuing debate.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[782]<\/a> Wittgenstein\u2019s \u201cPrivate Language\u201d argument in the Investigations (243-315) is perhaps the most complex example of a transcendental argument in the modern era.\u00a0 Rival schools of interpretation in light of Kripke\u2019s appropriation of it developed.\u00a0 The basic transcendental concept is clear though, language is public by nature and exists in a communal form of life, therefore a \u201cprivate\u201d language known only to an individual is not possible.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[783]<\/a> Lewis\u2019 arguments in Miracles<\/em> against naturalism are transcendental.\u00a0 He argues (as does Plantinga after him) that if naturalism is true, then it refutes itself.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[784]<\/a> We examine Van Til\u2019s distinctive form of transcendentalism, presuppositionalism<\/em>, shortly.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[785]<\/a> “Transcendental Arguments and\u00a0Scepticism,” in Eva\u00a0Schaper\u00a0and Wilhelm\u00a0Vossenkuhl\u00a0(eds.),\u00a0Reading\u00a0Kant<\/em>, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), p. 56.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[786]<\/a> Stroud, B. (1968). Transcendental Arguments. Journal of Philosophy, 65<\/em>, 241-256.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[787]<\/a> Some like Michael Martin attempted to resurrect the corpse as late as 1999.\u00a0 We will also consider an interesting variation on justifying the verification principle unrelated to this classical conception of verificationism.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[788]<\/a> Strawson, P. (2008 (1985)). Scepticism and Naturalism<\/em> (Routledge ed.). Oxford: Routledge., p.23.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[789]<\/a> Strawson, P. (2008 (1985)). Scepticism and Naturalism<\/em> (Routledge ed.). Oxford: Routledge., pp.27-28.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[790]<\/a> Moore would have had no such reticence in describing it as \u201csenseless\u201d.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[791]<\/a> Bahnsen, G., 1998. Van Til’s Apologetic – Readings and Analysis. <\/em>Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing., pp5-6.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[792]<\/a> Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief<\/em> (New York: Oxford University Press: 2000), p.217<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[793]<\/a> This phrase is particularly associated with post-Kuhnian discourse.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[794]<\/a> Montgomery, J. W. (1980 (1971)). Once Upon an A Priori. In E. Geehan (Ed.), Jerusalem and Athens – Critical Discussions on the Philosophy and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til<\/em> (pp. 380-403). Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[795]<\/a> More specifically Wittgensteinian <\/em>fideism.\u00a0 See Nielsen, K., & Phillips, D. (2005).<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[796]<\/a> \u201cPredication\u201d was a term still in common use in philosophy during the 1930s when Van Til was working out his theory.\u00a0 To predicate means simply to ascribe a property to an object, e.g., \u201credness\u201d, \u201croundness\u201d, \u201cphysical\u201d, \u201cmental\u201d etc.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[797]<\/a> Bahnsen (1998) traces the development of this argument in Van Til in pp.461-530.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[798]<\/a> Bahnsen, G. (1998). Van Til’s Apologetic – Readings and Analysis.<\/em> Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing., p.508.\u00a0 There are many places in Van Til where he deals directly with Kant, see the index entry in this work.\u00a0 Van Til accepted that the transcendental programme of Kant was appropriate but completely repudiated the autonomous presumption of Kant.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[799]<\/a> Bahnsen, G. (1998). Van Til’s Apologetic – Readings and Analysis.<\/em> Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing., p.509 and p.510, n.90.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[800]<\/a> Bahnsen, G. (1998). Van Til’s Apologetic – Readings and Analysis.<\/em> Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing., p.48.ff.\u00a0 This was also the locus of the disagreement between the later<\/em> Dooyeweerd and Van Til (Van Til had been greatly encouraged in his own transcendental critique reading the early Dooyeweerd) captured in the essays and the rejoinder in Geehan (Ed), pp.74-128.\u00a0 This was by far the longest and most detailed response written by Van Til in the volume.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[801]<\/a> This is the essence of Van Til\u2019s treatment of Descartes.\u00a0 He said the cogito failed as a transcendental because it does not prove anything beyond that thinking is occurring, it assumes<\/em> the further ground necessary for its own validation rather than proving an external world. \u00a0As such it was like \u201ca rock in a bottomless ocean\u201d.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[802]<\/a> Emphasis here on the agonising<\/em>.\u00a0 As Quine noted in his Theories and Things<\/em>, it can be difficult to make sense of transcendentalism, especially when we deal with the post-Heideggerian version.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[803]<\/a> For example, Baird (2003) provides the most thorough review, reassessment, and extension of transcendental arguments that I know of.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[804]<\/a> Gram, M. S. (1971). Transcendental Arguments. No\u00fbs, 5<\/em>(1), 15-26.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[805]<\/a> As we have noted previously, Hintikka was keen to draw a distinction between Kantian transcendental arguments and arguments like those of Strawson that were claiming to be transcendental.\u00a0 This might be technically correct, but it simply indicates the bounds of the definition had widened, it cannot be denied that Strawson was a neo-Kantian.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[806]<\/a> Hintikka, J. (1972). Transcendental Arguments: Genuine and Spurious. No\u00fbs, 6<\/em>(3), 274-281.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[807]<\/a> Gram, G. M. (1977). Must We Revisit Transcendental Arguments? Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 31<\/em>(4), 235-248.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[808]<\/a> There was a technical<\/em> and somewhat ill-tempered debate between the two men that ran for at least five years, with Gram in the final paper adopting a very different strategy, ceding a small amount of ground to Hintikka (perhaps making room for a method that might be \u2018transcendental\u2019, whilst simultaneously refusing to admit the category).\u00a0 Other exchanges involving Gram and Hintikka on unrelated matters seemed equally tense, both were Finnish and so there may have been a cultural angle to their exchanges that has not been sufficiently appreciated.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[809]<\/a> The technical issues might be distilled thus, transcendental arguments are a priori<\/em> arguments, and they are deductive arguments.\u00a0 We already have a priori<\/em> and deductive arguments as categories, why are we positing another category?<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[810]<\/a> McDowell\u2019s Mind and World<\/em> (1994) and a successor volume Having The World In View<\/em> (2009) are examples of modern post-Kantian transcendentalism.\u00a0 McDowell was noted for importing \u201ccontinental\u201d philosophy into analytic philosophy and the density (or enigma) of his prose at times is reminiscent of Continental writers though he was startingly well received in analytic circles (according to the backmatter of McDowell (2009)).<\/p>\n

      Speaking as one analytically minded, \u201cContinental\u201d transcendentalism as seen in the writing of say Han Pile (2007) can make one empathise quickly with Quine\u2019s observation regarding transcendentalism, \u201cas much as I can make sense of it<\/em>\u2026\u201d.\u00a0 That kind of transcendentalism, I believe, is attempting to be a \u201cpure\u201d Kantian transcendentalism articulating or attempting to reconstitute the categories of the understanding (rather than the broader conception as featured in Strawson which intentionally jettisoned the synthetic a priori and the doctrines of transcendental idealism).<\/p>\n

      I find it opaque, difficult to understand and even harder to apply but that could equally be a failure on my part to give sufficient attention to understanding the Continental mode of thought.\u00a0 It is certainly a matter of concern to me as an issue of my philosophical development.\u00a0 Interestingly though, it seems Strawson runs against the grain of this movement despite being the best-known transcendentalist of the generation (see Han-Pile n17) and gains clarity and understandableness as a consequence. \u00a0\u00d3 Murchadha, F. (2013) does a far better job of applying this mode of thought in a Christian context which makes my point \u2013 it is the Christian context that validates the transcendentals and transcendentalism generally.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[811]<\/a> Butler, M. (2001). The Transcendental Argument for God’s Existence. In S. M. Schlissel (Ed.), The Standard Bearer – A Festschrift for Greg Bahnsen<\/em> (pp. 65-124). Nacogdoches: Covenant Media Foundation, p.101.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[812]<\/a> The fullest statement of his argument runs to just 633 words and is found in \u2018A Survey of Christian Epistemology\u2019 (1969), pp.204-5.\u00a0 The brevity, of course, is not necessarily a weakness as this means the basic thrust of the argument can be understood by the young student as well as the tenured professor of fifty years but Van Til left it to his immediate disciples to develop and strengthen the argument.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[813]<\/a> Butler, M. (2001). The Transcendental Argument for God’s Existence. In S. M. Schlissel (Ed.), The Standard Bearer – A Festschrift for Greg Bahnsen<\/em> (pp. 65-124). Nacogdoches: Covenant Media Foundation., p.76.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[814]<\/a> Van Til\u2019s most influential work, The Defense of the Faith<\/em> was first published in 1955 and went through three editions to 1967.\u00a0 He was made emeritus in 1972 at over 70 years of age so it can be seen this work was extremely important in the latter stages of his career. Large sections of the work are responses to criticisms from both within and without the Reformed community which tends to obscure the coherence of the presentation of his views, this is why Bahnsen (1998) created his commentary, pulling together and systematising Van Til from this and other sources.\u00a0 Van Til certainly considered Bahnsen as the authority on his position.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[815]<\/a> Frame, J. (2015). Apologetics – A Justification of Christian Belief<\/em> (2nd ed.). (J. E. Torres, Ed.) Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing., pp.73-94.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[816]<\/a> Some of Frame\u2019s less sympathetic critics such as found on https:\/\/vantillianfire.wordpress.com\/<\/a> like to call him a \u201csoft\u201d Van Tillian.\u00a0 Butler, recognised as a \u201cstrong\u201d Van Tillian, does argue Frame has \u201cfundamentally departed\u201d from Van Til in some respects whilst acknowledging Frame as one who has made use of and developed other aspects of Van Til\u2019s thought.\u00a0 It should be noted that Frame personally knew Van Til and testifies that Van Til encouraged him as an advocate for his thought. \u00a0It should also be noted that Frame (1995), alongside Bahnsen (1998), is one of the few who have attempted a systematic overview of Van Til\u2019s thought, and his work was generally well-received in Reformed circles closest to Van Til.<\/p>\n

      Frame\u2019s greatest difficulty was with respect to transcendental arguments as a distinct argument form, Bahnsen (1988) was a direct challenge to Frame\u2019s interpretation on this key point of difference, made all the more notable in that John Frame was in the audience for one of the four lectures and Bahnsen was presenting his lecture to Frame\u2019s class.\u00a0 Butler was also in attendance.\u00a0 There is an interesting exchange at the end of the presentation in which Frame was present and in later work it seems Frame does acknowledge the strength of Bahnsen\u2019s counterarguments and accepts the legitimacy of the transcendental argument.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[817]<\/a> We might be tempted to argue here that this is a theological version of Gram\u2019s assault as he too argued it was merely a \u201cmethod\u201d.\u00a0 However, anyone reading Gram and Frame would have to concede they are proceeding on a totally dissimilar basis.\u00a0 Frame, in broad outline (with the qualification in the previous note), accepts Van Til\u2019s analysis.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[818]<\/a> Frame goes as far to argue that Aquinas was formulating his arguments assuming<\/em> the Christian worldview and therefore the Christian worldview was the transcendental for Aquinas.\u00a0 However, remarkable as Aquinas was, it was in his appropriation and application of Aristotle that provides the conceptual background to his work.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[819]<\/a> Butler, M. (2001). The Transcendental Argument for God’s Existence. In S. M. Schlissel (Ed.), The Standard Bearer – A Festschrift for Greg Bahnsen<\/em> (pp. 65-124). Nacogdoches: Covenant Media Foundation., p.80.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[820]<\/a> It is also worth noting as both Butler and Plantinga do, that the traditional causal arguments are poor<\/em> arguments that have been \u201csliced and diced\u201d since Hume and Kant took issue with them.\u00a0 Russell gave a second coat of derision in the 20th<\/sup> century.\u00a0 Whereas the ontological argument has managed a better defence in Plantinga, Plantinga hardly gives it a ringing endorsement even though he presents a \u201ctriumphant\u201d version of it (Plantinga (1977), pp.75-111), stating it fails as a piece of natural theology even if it can be proved as sound in form.\u00a0 It is of note he spends only 7 pages on both the teleological and cosmological arguments before dismissing them as logically inadequate, going as far to call the cosmological argument \u201coutrageous\u201d!<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[821]<\/a> This might be more understandable to those with a background in programming in object-orientated languages such as C++ and C# (like me).\u00a0 The programmer defines a \u201ctype\u201d which will have properties and other characteristics, this defines the basic behaviour and data for a \u201cclass\u201d (a program element template).\u00a0 Other types can \u201cinherit\u201d this type and sub or superclass its data or behaviour, but it will always be based on the base type<\/em> and will be constrained in its operations by that type.\u00a0 It does not matter how many variations with dramatically different behaviour there might be, there will always be some fundamental characteristic inherited from that base class.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[822]<\/a> Davidson, D. (2001 (1974)). On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation<\/em> (pp. 183-198). Oxford: Oxford University Press.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[823]<\/a> 8<\/sup> “For My thoughts are not a<\/sup>your thoughts, Neither are b<\/sup>your ways My ways,”<\/em> declares the LORD.\u00a0 9<\/sup> “For as the heavens are higher than the earth, So are My ways higher than your ways, And My thoughts than your thoughts.\u201d<\/em>\u00a0 Isaiah 55:8-9 (NAS).<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[824]<\/a> The founder of analytic psychology, and onetime collaborator with Freud, Carl Jung, did exactly that.\u00a0 He argued that evil must be integrated in the godhead to ensure the goodness of God was properly balanced, i.e., that God was psychologically stable and whole.\u00a0 His \u201cDream\u201d (of God the Phallus born from below) and the mystical \u201cDay Vision\u201d (where God on his throne defacates on the Basel cathedral) demonstrates to Jung that God was showing him He could be both good and bad; \u201cJung experiences show the rebirth of a God in the underworld and the destruction of the old religious dispensations of a God above moral reproach<\/em>\u201d (from a slide by my Psychology of Religion teacher who is an expert Jungian scholar, Prof. Lucy Huskinson).\u00a0 Of course, and this is very evident in Jung\u2019s other work, this took inspiration from Taoism and certain forms of Buddhism (Jung used mandalas as symbols of 4-some wholeness).<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[825]<\/a> This is evident in the \u201cChristian cults\u201d of Jehovah\u2019s witnesses, Mormons, Christadelphians, Christian Science etc. which inevitably evolve an entirely different system of theology that becomes antithetical to orthodox thought, despite claiming allegiance and faithfulness to the same scripture.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[826]<\/a> \u00d3 Murchadha, F. (2013) undertakes an extremely ambitious account of this within the continental school of thought but manages to maintain a perspicuity of language which, with some work and patience on the part of the reader, makes it a rewarding and enriching read both on a spiritual and a philosophical level.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[827]<\/a> See also \u00a76.3.5 where we discuss the context of Stroud\u2019s criticism in more detail.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[828]<\/a> Stroud, B. (1968). Transcendental Arguments. Journal of Philosophy, 65<\/em>, 256.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[829]<\/a> The preponderance of \u2018Flat Earth\u2019 theorists armed with their empirical analysis and their 200 proofs why the Earth is flat should make this clear, lest we doubt!\u00a0 See https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/science\/brain-flapping\/2016\/jan\/26\/earth-totally-flat-conspiracy-bob<\/a> .<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[830]<\/a>[830] Butler, M. (2001). The Transcendental Argument for God’s Existence. In S. M. Schlissel (Ed.), The Standard Bearer – A Festschrift for Greg Bahnsen<\/em> (pp. 65-124). Nacogdoches: Covenant Media Foundation., pp.88-99.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[831]<\/a> He finishes both Plantinga (2000) and the abbreviated summary, Plantinga (2015) with this thought.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[832]<\/a> Butler, M. (2001). The Transcendental Argument for God’s Existence. In S. M. Schlissel (Ed.), The Standard Bearer – A Festschrift for Greg Bahnsen<\/em> (pp. 65-124). Nacogdoches: Covenant Media Foundation., p.123.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[833]<\/a> Baird, B. N. (2003, May). TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS AND THE CALL OF METAPHYSICS (PhD Thesis). Retrieved Oct 22, 2022, from University of Georgia Graduate School Archive: https:\/\/getd.libs.uga.edu\/pdfs\/baird_bryan_n_200305_phd.pdf<\/a>, pp.126-177.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[834]<\/a> He bolsters this claim by citing historical work by Genova (1980, 1984) and Stine (1972) as a support to the transcendental derivation of the verificationist principle.<\/p>\n

      <\/a>[835]<\/a> We might be reminded here of the conclusion of Schlick in repudiating classical Kantian dogma of the mind imposing its form on reality.<\/p>\n

      \n
      \n
      The Christian Presupposition<\/a><\/div>\n
      Final Conclusion<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
      \n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

      6\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Transcendental Argument for God (TAG) 6.1\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Introduction In this section, we formalise our work of the previous two chapters with transcendental reasoning and demonstrate how Van Til presented his argument designed to demonstrate the existence of God as objectively provable.\u00a0 We consider: The distinctive logical form. Examine the historical pedigree of the form. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":972,"parent":1391,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-1423","page","type-page","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry"],"yoast_head":"\r\nThe Transcendental Argument for God (TAG) - Planet M Blog<\/title>\r\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"The Transcendental Argument for God (TAG) - THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS PROJECT\" \/>\r\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\r\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/the-transcendental-argument-for-god-tag\/\" \/>\r\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_GB\" \/>\r\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\r\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The Transcendental Argument for God (TAG) - Planet M Blog\" \/>\r\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The Transcendental Argument for God (TAG) - THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS PROJECT\" \/>\r\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/the-transcendental-argument-for-god-tag\/\" \/>\r\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Planet M Blog\" \/>\r\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2025-08-17T13:11:27+00:00\" \/>\r\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/12\/Healing-2.jpg\" \/>\r\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"900\" \/>\r\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"600\" \/>\r\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\r\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\r\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Estimated reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"49 minutes\" \/>\r\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/the-transcendental-argument-for-god-tag\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/the-transcendental-argument-for-god-tag\/\",\"name\":\"The Transcendental Argument for God (TAG) - Planet M Blog\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/the-transcendental-argument-for-god-tag\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/the-transcendental-argument-for-god-tag\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/12\/Healing-2.jpg\",\"datePublished\":\"2025-08-16T21:20:31+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2025-08-17T13:11:27+00:00\",\"description\":\"The Transcendental Argument for God (TAG) - THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS PROJECT\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/the-transcendental-argument-for-god-tag\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-GB\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/the-transcendental-argument-for-god-tag\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-GB\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/the-transcendental-argument-for-god-tag\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/12\/Healing-2.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/12\/Healing-2.jpg\",\"width\":900,\"height\":600},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/the-transcendental-argument-for-god-tag\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"PhD – THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS PROJECT\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":3,\"name\":\"The Transcendental Argument for God (TAG)\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/\",\"name\":\"Planet Macneil Blog\",\"description\":\"The blog of Dr Michael P\u00f2l Macneil PhD\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/#\/schema\/person\/78d80b09bb7f5dca3e2779fb6a2c2d33\"},\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-GB\"},{\"@type\":[\"Person\",\"Organization\"],\"@id\":\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/#\/schema\/person\/78d80b09bb7f5dca3e2779fb6a2c2d33\",\"name\":\"Michael Macneil\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-GB\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/8c23bafa3d0e8438466d9d51dd2b843fab8754f428006edc6c50c8d9b66d9fa1?s=96&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/8c23bafa3d0e8438466d9d51dd2b843fab8754f428006edc6c50c8d9b66d9fa1?s=96&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/8c23bafa3d0e8438466d9d51dd2b843fab8754f428006edc6c50c8d9b66d9fa1?s=96&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Michael Macneil\"},\"logo\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/8c23bafa3d0e8438466d9d51dd2b843fab8754f428006edc6c50c8d9b66d9fa1?s=96&r=g\"},\"description\":\"I write software and am studying part-time for a PhD in philosophy. I have an MSc in Electronic Engineering and an MA in Studies in Philosophy and Religion. I am a Microsoft Certified Professional with an MCSD. I have a teaching qualification in Physics and like most things science. Otherwise I like classic VWs, watching Rodney Howard-Browne, playing guitar and making computer music.\",\"sameAs\":[\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\"]}]}<\/script>\r\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"The Transcendental Argument for God (TAG) - Planet M Blog","description":"The Transcendental Argument for God (TAG) - THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS PROJECT","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/the-transcendental-argument-for-god-tag\/","og_locale":"en_GB","og_type":"article","og_title":"The Transcendental Argument for God (TAG) - Planet M Blog","og_description":"The Transcendental Argument for God (TAG) - THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS PROJECT","og_url":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/the-transcendental-argument-for-god-tag\/","og_site_name":"Planet M Blog","article_modified_time":"2025-08-17T13:11:27+00:00","og_image":[{"width":900,"height":600,"url":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/12\/Healing-2.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_misc":{"Estimated reading time":"49 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/the-transcendental-argument-for-god-tag\/","url":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/the-transcendental-argument-for-god-tag\/","name":"The Transcendental Argument for God (TAG) - Planet M Blog","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/the-transcendental-argument-for-god-tag\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/the-transcendental-argument-for-god-tag\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/12\/Healing-2.jpg","datePublished":"2025-08-16T21:20:31+00:00","dateModified":"2025-08-17T13:11:27+00:00","description":"The Transcendental Argument for God (TAG) - THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS PROJECT","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/the-transcendental-argument-for-god-tag\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-GB","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/the-transcendental-argument-for-god-tag\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-GB","@id":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/the-transcendental-argument-for-god-tag\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/12\/Healing-2.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/12\/Healing-2.jpg","width":900,"height":600},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/the-transcendental-argument-for-god-tag\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"PhD – THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS PROJECT","item":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":3,"name":"The Transcendental Argument for God (TAG)"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/#website","url":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/","name":"Planet Macneil Blog","description":"The blog of Dr Michael P\u00f2l Macneil PhD","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/#\/schema\/person\/78d80b09bb7f5dca3e2779fb6a2c2d33"},"potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-GB"},{"@type":["Person","Organization"],"@id":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/#\/schema\/person\/78d80b09bb7f5dca3e2779fb6a2c2d33","name":"Michael Macneil","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-GB","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/8c23bafa3d0e8438466d9d51dd2b843fab8754f428006edc6c50c8d9b66d9fa1?s=96&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/8c23bafa3d0e8438466d9d51dd2b843fab8754f428006edc6c50c8d9b66d9fa1?s=96&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/8c23bafa3d0e8438466d9d51dd2b843fab8754f428006edc6c50c8d9b66d9fa1?s=96&r=g","caption":"Michael Macneil"},"logo":{"@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/8c23bafa3d0e8438466d9d51dd2b843fab8754f428006edc6c50c8d9b66d9fa1?s=96&r=g"},"description":"I write software and am studying part-time for a PhD in philosophy. I have an MSc in Electronic Engineering and an MA in Studies in Philosophy and Religion. I am a Microsoft Certified Professional with an MCSD. I have a teaching qualification in Physics and like most things science. Otherwise I like classic VWs, watching Rodney Howard-Browne, playing guitar and making computer music.","sameAs":["https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog"]}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1423","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1423"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1423\/revisions"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1391"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/972"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1423"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}