{"id":1419,"date":"2025-08-16T22:07:10","date_gmt":"2025-08-16T21:07:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/?page_id=1419"},"modified":"2025-08-17T13:56:45","modified_gmt":"2025-08-17T12:56:45","slug":"beyond-anti-philosophy-to-transcendentalism","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/beyond-anti-philosophy-to-transcendentalism\/","title":{"rendered":"Beyond Anti-Philosophy to Transcendentalism"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/a>4\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Beyond Anti-Philosophy to Transcendentalism<\/h1>\n

<\/a><\/a><\/a>4.1\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Transcendentalism \u2013 First Remarks<\/h2>\n

We seem to be confronted with a most basic philosophical problem that has become increasingly into focus whether we approach the problem from a naturalist direction as in Quine and Kuhn or seek an authentically Christian philosophy through Plantinga and Van Til.\u00a0 It appears we can only cogently argue when we posit a worldview or, following Wittgenstein, a distinct \u201cform of life\u201d<\/em> <\/a>[635]<\/a> which defines our terms and gives us semantic content. However, therein lies the philosophical problems, \u201con its own terms\u201d or a \u201cform of life\u201d have been attacked as synonyms for \u201ccircular\u201d reasoning or \u201cfideism\u201d <\/a>[636]<\/a> when applied to religious or spiritual thought.\u00a0 Part of the task of this chapter is to understand this charge of circularity and to refute it.\u00a0 Similarly, we will assert that circularity does not imply relativism for a correctly articulated Christian philosophy.<\/p>\n

That is, both these objections are shown to evaporate as problems when circularity is correctly understood. \u00a0First, we understand that all argumentation<\/em> is circular because it is assuming that rationality itself is rational <\/em>(or reasonable), it cannot proceed<\/em> on any other basis.\u00a0 That is, there is a transcendental<\/em> assumption about the nature of reason which we must implicitly acknowledge to engage in debate, and we must consequently make this explicit by giving a basic articulation and defence of rationality and the necessity of the transcendental framework if we are to salvage rationality from postmodern relativism.<\/p>\n

Our transcendental vision of reason is most immediately associated with Kant and his Critique of Pure Reason<\/em>, where he posits as transcendental<\/em> that which makes possible, or which must be assumed when we claim knowledge of objects. \u00a0Whilst we reject the details of his solution <\/a>[637]<\/a> and deny that his transcendental deduction actually deduced sufficient transcendental principles,<\/a>[638]<\/a> we concur with his asking of that question.\u00a0 Our major task will be to map out the character of reason, the transcendental category and defend this conception to provide the groundwork for its application in our particular Christian context.<\/p>\n

<\/a><\/a><\/a>4.2\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Transcendentalism and Scepticism<\/h2>\n

Transcendentalism has a most unusual and welcome side-effect for our war against scepticism. \u00a0Consider one who argues<\/em> as a thorough-going Humean sceptic argues that we can have no reasonable basis for reason and therefore we have no obligation to behave reasonably.\u00a0 By doing a transcendental critique we can dismiss this argument as incoherent because on its own basis there can be no basis for drawing that conclusion, i.e., it is assuming to be correct by the action of arguing what it is trying to show by<\/em> the argument to be false.\u00a0 This was the radical approach of neo-Kantian Strawson in the early 1960s who revived interest in the nature of transcendental arguments and what could be proved with them.\u00a0 Their most attractive feature to philosophers at that time was this potential to be scepticism refuting in a post-positivistic climate that was antagonistic to the possibility of strong knowledge claims.<\/p>\n

As an illustrative example, Wittgenstein argued<\/em> and argued transcendentally<\/em> against the possibility of a \u201cPrivate Language\u201d because<\/em> he argued that \u201clanguage\u201d always<\/em> assumes a communal context.<\/a>[639]<\/a> \u00a0This is one of the clearest examples of the form and promise of the transcendental mode of argument where you move from a premise that is commonly accepted (even by the sceptic) to the oftentimes fiercely disputed general principle that rests behind it (or better, that is logically necessary to it) and that you want to establish (contra the sceptic).\u00a0 In this case, we also get a sense of the broad character and scope of the conclusion, it is a general <\/em>principle rather than a logical deduction, an inductive or abductive inference of the same basic character as the premise(s).\u00a0 This is another distinctive of the truly transcendental argument, it is a principle with broad application to the world and its conclusion is categorically distinct from its premises.<\/a>[640]<\/a><\/p>\n

There is much more to be said regarding transcendentalism but for our purposes now it enables us to prima facie posit that reason is<\/em> reasonable and we can in principle offer some basic analysis and defence of reason, rationality, and some further mitigations of the sceptical challenge.\u00a0 This is pertinent for us as it helps us to appreciate how it is both possible to understand alleged worldviews or \u201cforms of life\u201d on their own terms yet subject them to transcendental critique to evaluate them for coherence and correspondence.\u00a0 This is our defence against relativism, we acknowledge their \u201ccircularity\u201d and any transcendental claims to be justifying human predication as prima facie<\/em> legitimate, whilst subsequently subjecting them to an internal critique on their own terms and judging them to be illegitimate as truly transcendental.<\/a>[641]<\/a><\/p>\n

<\/a><\/a><\/a>4.3\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Practical and Theoretical Reason<\/h2>\n

Most obviously, we understand that the concept of reason itself is only made cogent by having a commitment to it both in its theoretical and practical operations. <\/a>[642]<\/a>\u00a0 In broad strokes, \u201ctheoretical\u201d reasoning is what we employ when we are dealing with reason as a tool of analysis and theorising; \u201cpractical\u201d reasoning is dealing with moral reasoning, i.e., deciding between right and wrong.\u00a0 At this point, by considering the integral role of the whole of reason with respect to life and living, we are fully confronted with its role as fundamental and basic to existing and living in the world; this surely arrests the sceptical challenge to the epistemological legitimacy and importance of a non-sceptical orientation to reason.<\/a>[643]<\/a><\/p>\n

That is, we are positing rationality (acting in accordance with reason) is an inevitable and an ethically commendable state of affairs; it is to be preferred<\/em> over the irrational and the immoral.\u00a0 Ethical theorists such as Baier (who during the 1960s was influential in arresting the slide into relativism in moral philosophy <\/a>[644]<\/a> ) and Blackburn in the postmodern epoch <\/a>[645]<\/a> offer a vigorous account of rationality and argue passionately that there are such a thing as moral truths, which are what we ought<\/em> to do as rational beings.\u00a0 This is often cogent writing in response to the denial of the possibility of moral knowledge and so should be welcomed. \u00a0However, we have reason to be concerned.\u00a0 Baier and Blackburn after a lifetime of reflection give us these defences of rationality and ethical imperatives respectively:<\/p>\n

\u201c\u2018What are the capacities, powers, and abilities involved in having reason, in being a rational being?\u2019\u00a0 The answer is that we cannot (at least, as yet) say, in any physiological, or other precise empirical terminology, wherein that capacity consists\u2026full rationality consists in the ability to perform the various activities of reason, involving the use of the various appropriate types of reasons in accordance with the relevant procedures of reasoning\u201d.<\/a>[646]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cSystemisation should stop in theory just as it does in proper living.\u00a0 So what we need is not elaborate codifications and deductions\u2026Persons on different mountains need not perturb us\u2026unless they can show that they are where we ought to be.\u00a0 But to show that they must do some ethics\u2026That is how it is, and how it must be\u201d.<\/a>[647]<\/a><\/p>\n

Both of these passages seem to have linguistic scaffolding that is relying on what they were trying to argue that is narrow enough to make us consider whether there are logical fallacies at the centre of these conceptions.\u00a0 The definitions are in terms of related words \u2013 rather like looking in a dictionary to find a definition of science as \u201cthat which follows the scientific method\u201d<\/em> and the next question is naturally \u201cwhat is the scientific method<\/em>?\u201d;<\/em> you then look at the definition of scientific method and find, \u201cthe method that is in accordance with science\u201d<\/em>.\u00a0 At best, we have a \u201cmiserable tautology\u201d and at worst we are logically fallacious.<\/p>\n

However, being charitable, we want<\/em> to agree with Blackburn against the postmodern relativist, and with Baier we want<\/em> to believe there is a singular moral point of view and we want to legitimately maintain with Blackburn that a concentration camp guard who tortures is<\/em> culpable.<\/a>[648]<\/a>\u00a0 Both recognise there is \u201csomething\u201d we want to recognise as reason and rationality, but their circularity still makes us instinctively uneasy, because their naturalist conceptions fail to offer an objective grounding.\u00a0 When pushed at this point of ambiguity they have no authority claim but convention or some other social basis as a grounding and that is precisely the point at issue for the postmodern sceptic: \u201cmorality is socially constructed, and I reject the tyranny of its totalising metanarrative!\u201d<\/em>.\u00a0 The sceptic can sneer thus, and the relativist retains a smug sense of satisfaction.<\/p>\n

However, there is not necessarily a need to construe this terminus as destructively circular and then re-surrender to sceptical doubt.\u00a0 Rather we remind ourselves of the impossibility of a neutral vantage point to view our problem that we considered in the previous chapter, and we must recognise that there are limits to where the theorising can take us before we are making a commitment that might fail the rigours of an alleged \u201cneutral\u201d standard to judge against.\u00a0 In fact, we can see that this claim to \u201cneutrality\u201d is now seen to be completely empty, at a certain level in our reasoning claims, what we might call ultimate authority<\/em>, we (and our opponent) are assuming the authority of what we are arguing for as we argue for it, so there is no external, neutral ground upon which we can meet; that is, we have begun to argue by presupposition and transcendentally<\/em>, whether well or poorly.\u00a0 This is another characteristic that Kant considered unique to the transcendental mode of argument, it makes possible its own proof.<\/em><\/p>\n

Thus, the transcendental approach, in important aspects, is a general epistemological and methodological position, not a specifically Christian one.\u00a0 Both Quine and Neurath <\/a>[649]<\/a> wanted to appeal to the \u201cwhole of science\u201d as the ultimate authority (or transcendental) and did not consider it destructively<\/em> circular, though they openly acknowledged its circularity.\u00a0 Thus, we<\/em> should be well within our epistemic rights to legitimately adopt a similar framework and claim equal philosophical respectability. \u00a0Except, as noted in our earliest analysis, our definition of \u201cscience\u201d is comprehensive and our belief in a natural law is not an aggregation of brute fact with the passing of time but reflects the providence of God.\u00a0 We posit a transcendent<\/em> transcendental of the triune God that rationally justifies these transcendentals of nature.\u00a0 Let us examine this issue more closely and see how this analogous approach is justified in principle and practice.<\/p>\n

<\/a><\/a><\/a>4.4\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Worldviews and Ultimate Authority<\/h2>\n

We have already encountered in our previous discussion at various points the philosopher Quine who was one of the most influential of the \u201cscientific\u201d philosophers of the second half of the 20th<\/sup> century, famous first for his refutation of logical positivism and then for the construction of a rigorous naturalism that favoured a behaviouristic interpretation of the knowledge construction process.\u00a0 In formulating his philosophy, Quine summarised his methodology thus, \u201cthe answer to any scientific question must come from within science itself \u2013 it is the whole of science that is constitutive of knowledge<\/em>\u201d. <\/a>[650]<\/a>\u00a0 However, imagine repositing the proposition thus, \u201cthe answer to any question regarding the status of Christian belief must be answered from within the revelation of the scriptures \u2013 it is the whole of scripture and only scripture that is constitutive of Christian knowledge.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n

Now, to assert the latter would immediately raise fierce accusations of \u201ccircularity\u201d and \u201cquestion begging\u201d, not least from within the evidentialist Christian theological community and open derision from the secular \u201cscientific\u201d community. <\/a>[651]<\/a>\u00a0 However, we have already seen that Quine recognised the circularity<\/em> of his position but was unphased by it \u2013 it was a necessary<\/em> interpretative principle of his naturalistic worldview:\u00a0 if <\/em>his proposition regarding the whole of science was correct, the answer must<\/em>, necessarily, be from within science. <\/a>[652]<\/a>\u00a0 It is functioning as a transcendental <\/em>in the sense it is making possible the objects of knowledge. <\/a>[653]<\/a>\u00a0 Thus, for Quine it was appropriate to naturalise philosophy<\/em> by making it contiguous with science and thus amenable to a naturalisation of first ontology, then epistemology, and finally ethics. <\/a>[654]<\/a> The scope of his principle really was the entire account of reality interpreted within the interlocking presuppositions that formed his worldview:<\/p>\n

\u201c[A]ll ascription of reality must come from within one\u2019s theory of the world; it is incoherent otherwise\u2026Truth is immanent, and there is no higher.\u00a0 We must speak from within a theory, albeit any of various\u201d.<\/a>[655]<\/a><\/p>\n

For example, Quine in response to a critical essay over normative ethical judgments asserted:<\/p>\n

\u201cNaturalization of epistemology does not jettison the normative and settle for the indiscriminate<\/em> description of ongoing procedures\u2026normative epistemology is a branch of engineering.\u00a0 It is the technology of truth-seeking\u2026\u201d.<\/a>[656]<\/a> (Emphasis added).<\/p>\n

There could be no more a consistent naturalist than Quine to ascribe moral questions as a matter of engineering <\/em><\/a>[657]<\/a>, yet the question remains how he decided what is \u201cindiscriminate\u201d in ethical reasoning.\u00a0 Quine\u2019s answer was that the normative was a description of what was with respect to some \u201cterminal condition\u201d and offers the solution to the normative ethical problem as requiring \u201c[viewing the terminal condition] as aimed at reward in heaven\u201d<\/em>.<\/a>[658]<\/a>\u00a0 We can hear the hallelujah chorus as all the Christians say \u2018Amen\u2019!\u00a0 Of course, he is stating this not by way of a newly found religious commitment because of the relentless march of apologetic logic, but as a<\/em> possible solution to the normativity problem in ethics which he is effectively asserting will yield no solution by the same process we decide on \u201cnormativity\u201d in the other parts of nature.\u00a0 Thus, it is difficult to see how a thoroughgoing naturalism can ever be anything more than arbitrary in any criterion it furnishes to judge<\/em> an ongoing procedure of life, for that very act of judging (as Quine\u2019s final words of response demonstrated) imports in non-natural conceptions.<\/p>\n

Yet Quine goes even further for us in providing the criteria for validating a particular view of the world:<\/p>\n

\u201c\u2026what if, happily and unbeknownst, we have achieved a theory that is conformable to every possible observation, past and future?\u00a0 In what sense could the world then be said to deviate from what the theory claims?\u00a0 Clearly in none\u2026 [our theory demands] only that it be structured [to assure us what] to expect\u201d.<\/a>[659]<\/a><\/p>\n

This is his characteristic recourse to the legitimacy of theories on the basis of their empirical equivalence regardless of their ultimate truth value <\/a>[660]<\/a> (though, importantly, Quine maintained there was<\/em> such a state as true<\/em>), but in context Quine is concerned in making both ontological and epistemological (and by implication ethical) claims.\u00a0 Eyebrows might certainly be raised accusing Quine of the latter and he indeed calls it \u201cunaccustomed territory\u201d<\/em> <\/a>[661]<\/a> but it is noteworthy that like Blackburn he does not endorse a neutral pluralism in the public square:<\/p>\n

\u201c\u2026the proper<\/em> counsel is not one of pluralistic tolerance.\u00a0 One\u2019s disapproval of gratuitous torture, for example, easily withstands one\u2019s failure to make a causal reduction, and so be it.\u00a0 We can still call the good good and the bad bad, and hope\u2026\u201d <\/a>[662]<\/a> (Emphasis added).<\/p>\n

Thus, when Van Til takes his ultimate authority as scripture, arguing that the answer to any problem must be found from within the worldview ascribed by scripture, he argues essentially in a methodologically manner analogous to Quine.\u00a0 Similarly, when Van Til asserts that there are no such things as brute, uninterpreted facts, <\/a>[663]<\/a> he is perfectly within his Quinean granted epistemic rights, he is merely articulating his theory of the world, \u201cFactuality like gravitation and electric charge, is internal to our theory of nature\u201d<\/em>.<\/a>[664]<\/a>\u00a0 Similarly, we can with Van Til, assert our ontological, epistemological, and ethical claims and be perfectly confident that our theory of the world corresponds and coheres with reality as we perceive and conceive of it.\u00a0 We are merely articulating our view of the world and find that we too can call the \u201cgood good and the bad bad\u201d<\/em>.<\/p>\n

However, where Quine stumbles over moral commitments as matters of blind hope in Darwinian chance we differ, in that because we have the transcendental of a transcendent God, we have a normative basis which we claim as objective<\/em> \u2013 where objective is posited as in concordance with this mind of God.\u00a0 The challenge in our following sections will be to substantiate that claim and demonstrate that our transcendental is the only valid one that facilitates a coherent worldview.<\/p>\n

<\/a><\/a><\/a>4.5\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 All Reasoning is \u2018Circular Reasoning\u2019 but not all Reasoning is \u2018Viciously Circular\u2019.<\/h2>\n

So, in summary of the argument above, no one informed enough to understand Quine\u2019s argument would accuse him of being logically fallacious, drawing a conclusion for a syllogistic argument whilst assuming the conclusion in a premise, i.e., viciously circular<\/em>, but his reasoning is<\/em>, nevertheless, robustly, and undeniably circular.\u00a0 Similarly, our main philosophical protagonists beyond myself in this thesis, Van Til and Plantinga too are \u201ccircular\u201d in their argumentation, but they need not hang their heads in shame; we cannot escape it.<\/p>\n

Plantinga\u2019s \u201ccircular argument\u201d is the wide circle of the cogency and legitimate rationality of Christian belief:<\/p>\n

\u201c[E]ven if Christian believers are justified<\/em> in their beliefs, they might still be irrational<\/em>\u2026A belief is rational if it is produced by cognitive faculties that are functioning properly and successfully aimed at truth\u2026Now warrant, the property enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief, is a property or quantity had by a belief if and only if\u2026that belief is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth\u2026.[T]he real question\u2026is whether Christian belief does or can have warrant\u201d.<\/a>[665]<\/a><\/p>\n

For Plantinga, the warrant accumulates on the basis of an interpretation of Calvin\u2019s concept of the sensus divinitus<\/em>, the part of the human cognitive makeup that recognises \u201cGod\u201d when it encounters him in the world. <\/a>[666]<\/a>\u00a0 As we worked through in a previous chapter, Plantinga has modified rationality from classical foundationalism, recasting it using a thoroughly strengthened form of Reidian foundationalism and it is this<\/em> specific conception of rationality (his circle) that he seeks to validate, and which serves to authenticate the biblical Christian worldview.<\/a>[667]<\/a><\/p>\n

In contrast, Van Til\u2019s circle used the idioms of idealism and explicitly addresses the charge of circularity, at once admitting to it and qualifying how it should be understood, i.e., not as an elementary logical fallacy. \u00a0He spoke of \u201cspiral\u201d reasoning and \u201cimplicating\u201d oneself deeper into a system at each iteration assuming what was posited:<\/p>\n

\u201cWho wishes to make such a simple blunder in elementary logic, as to say that we believe something to be true because it is in the Bible?\u00a0 Our answer to this is briefly that we prefer to reason in a circle to not reasoning at all.\u00a0 Or we may call it spiral reasoning.\u00a0 <\/em>We must go round and round a thing to see more of its dimensions\u2026Unless we are larger than God we cannot reason about him in any other way, than by a transcendental or circular argument\u201d.<\/a>[668]<\/a><\/p>\n

Thus, \u201ccircularity\u201d, might simply be taken to mean consistency<\/em> and coherence<\/em> of any rational system as a whole<\/em>; as long as our circles are \u201cbroad\u201d, we can withstand the circularity charge without so much as a blush.<\/p>\n

<\/a><\/a><\/a>4.6\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 A Form of Life<\/h2>\n

Our conclusion above seems to involve a paradox.\u00a0 As we noted in Quine, he merely recommended \u201cany theory from various\u201d<\/em>, which if we did not know better from our previous examination of his position, would seem to imply relativism on his part. \u00a0However, something different is being argued here, relativism argues for an absolute equivalency of competing epistemologies, but Quine still believed there was immanent truth to be had, he just recognised that incommensurate theories might nevertheless be empirically equivalent in under-attested conditions. \u00a0As data accumulates the efficacy of one or both rival theories could be compromised and a new one needs to emerge. <\/a>[669]<\/a><\/p>\n

So, although we can dismiss the charge of relativism, he can never<\/em> give us an objective basis for his commitment because his naturalism constrains him that one is not possible. <\/a>[670]<\/a> \u00a0It would also seem that although he repudiates relativism, the cash value of his position becomes that of the relativist; we might say he was operationally<\/em> relativist. \u00a0It seems the real difference between the Quinean naturalist, and the relativist seems to be one of philosophical temper; one is a physicalist, the other is a philologist and never the twain shall meet except to throw missiles across the epistemological barricade, but they end up on the same battlefield, nevertheless.<\/p>\n

The intelligent relativist, appropriating Wittgenstein, argues that it is indeed impossible to judge a \u201cform of life\u201d<\/em>, a composite of metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical positions, i.e., a worldview<\/em> with a specific linguistic expression that can only be understood from within that community.\u00a0 Although one might \u201cspeak\u201d with the same words and signs, it is in the living of life and the use<\/em> <\/a>[671]<\/a> of the words in the context of that community which give it meaning.\u00a0 This is indeed a powerful argument, but it must be recognised that Wittgenstein was also<\/em> a man of principle and values, <\/a>[672]<\/a> he believed that one could<\/em> and should<\/em> be a \u201cdecent human being\u201d<\/em>. <\/a>[673]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cDecent\u201d implies a value judgment and an appropriate framework. \u00a0He certainly did not advocate a life without principles though it is undeniable that his work has frequently been used by those who have favoured a postmodern, relativistic, or pragmatic philosophy and who view morality as simply \u201csocially constructed\u201d<\/em>.<\/a>[674]<\/a>\u00a0 Such a reading of Wittgenstein, though popular, is difficult to sustain on close examination as it seems to misconstrue Wittgenstein as somehow \u201ctheorising\u201d about \u201cforms of life\u201d, rather than just describing them and analysing them to understand them.<\/p>\n

If there was anything that Wittgenstein rejected, it was \u201ctheorising\u201d in the traditional philosophical sense.\u00a0 However, what Wittgenstein might<\/em> have properly asserted as a theoretical aspect of language is that it had a public<\/em> context and he then proceeded to argue transcendentally<\/em> to demonstrate the necessity.\u00a0 For example, his famous \u2018Private Language\u2019 argument from the Investigations <\/em>is sometimes viewed as a highly complex transcendental argument where he seeks to establish the impossibility of a private language and in doing so refute solipsism (the denial of the existence of other minds).\u00a0 Such is the complexity of the argument, there are rival schools of interpretation of it. <\/a>[675]<\/a><\/p>\n

However, Plantinga, interestingly, describes this argument as \u201cweak\u201d. \u00a0His first major book asserted that the status of the justification of other minds and of arguments for theistic belief were of equivalent logical quality. <\/a>[676]<\/a> \u00a0So, the believer could not be considered irrational<\/em> in believing if<\/em> it was rational to believe in other minds, which he believed could also not be proved but was clearly considered \u2018rational\u2019.\u00a0 What Plantinga was perhaps admitting here was that if Wittgenstein\u2019s transcendental argument has succeeded, his<\/em> was the argument that was weak.\u00a0 However, in line with Richter\u2019s assessment that \u201cOrdinary Language Philosophy\u201d (inspired by this mode of interpreting Wittgenstein) had fallen \u201cout of favour\u201d, Plantinga downgraded the relevance and applicability of Wittgenstein\u2019s argument for the rationality of religious belief in the new preface published 23 years later. <\/a>[677]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

However, Plantinga\u2019s sophisticated sceptical approach in that work was also considered controversial by some such that in responding to the criticism of it and the developing his own thought, he progressively built on the rejection of the classical foundationalism of this early work.\u00a0 He refined and improved it over the succeeding decades, until the RE project <\/a>[678]<\/a> with Wolterstorff, Alstom and others gave the arguments a much stronger form and stronger still in his Warrant<\/em> trilogy. <\/a>[679]<\/a>\u00a0 In that form there are elements of Plantinga that most certainly resonate with the epistemic rights of a community to proceed to believe without a common evidential basis with their critics.<\/p>\n

Thus, both Wittgenstein and Plantinga are both seen to agree on the grounding of meaning as something more complex than empirical considerations and local to a community whose use of the language gave meaning to the discourse.\u00a0 Plantinga was even considered as offering a \u201ctranscendental defence\u201d against naturalism by Craig, but this claim is at best an inference characterising his philosophical project as a whole<\/em>, rather than explicitly articulated in his work. <\/a>[680]<\/a><\/p>\n

<\/a><\/a><\/a>4.7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Necessity of a Transcendental Defence<\/h2>\n

Thus, as unexpected as it may be, we are seeing that a transcendental defence of Christian belief and a transcendental critique of the non-Christian worldview are the only ways of assessing the competing truth claims. \u00a0Otherwise, it seems a matter of preference whether we pick Quine or Van Til.\u00a0 Thus, we will consider the critique in the next section and the defence in more detail here.\u00a0 Van Til argues for not just a transcendental justification for our reason but for worldview<\/em> apologetics with a transcendent<\/em> transcendental first principle.\u00a0 In this way he circumvents the self-vitiating naturalism of Quine and can move beyond the relativism of a neo-Wittgensteinian without the religious fideism. <\/a>[681]<\/a><\/p>\n

Van Til argues that God is the necessary, metaphysical bridge in our belief structure (Plantinga uses the term \u2018noetic structure\u2019) that allows us to move to certainty, that the thoughtful ethical naturalism of a Blackburn we noted desires but can never get us to.\u00a0 We might even pull in Descartes as a supporting witness who at this level, recognised absolute claims of knowledge need a transcendent basis, \u201c[the atheist, strictly speaking] cannot have systematic knowledge unless he has been created by the true God, a God who has no intention to deceive\u201d<\/em>. <\/a>[682]<\/a>\u00a0 Similarly, in the words of Williams, \u201cwe may feel happier to live without foundations of knowledge<\/em> [but Descartes did not]\u201d <\/a>[683]<\/a> and it is well to remember the first division in Descartes notebook was \u201cthe fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom<\/em>\u201d <\/a>[684]<\/a> which is the very foundation of Van Til\u2019s (and Plantinga\u2019s) epistemological methodology.<\/p>\n

However, we, of course, have just entered inadvertently into the controversy of Descartes religious commitment or the lack thereof and need to be careful to represent Descartes accurately.\u00a0 Schouls argued that the sacred-secular dichotomy in his methodology permitted an apologetic interpretation equally suited for atheism as to theism.<\/a>[685]<\/a> \u00a0The atheist Cartesian can in thought maintain a hypothesis<\/em> of a perfect deceiver but if it was a perfect deceiver then by Descartes\u2019 rule the perfect deceiver must exist and would be God because God alone has necessary existence.\u00a0 However, the concept of God is then self-contradictory because Descartes himself asserted that \u201cthe will to deceive is undoubtedly evidence of malice or weakness, and so cannot apply to God\u201d<\/em> <\/a>[686]<\/sup><\/a> and the atheist Cartesian following Descartes own rules can safely assert God cannot exist and can trust his reason with no fear of contradiction.\u00a0 Descartes himself seemed to hold the door open to the ultimate autonomy of the human will because of the innate freedom of it even when confronted with an all-powerful deceiver:<\/p>\n

\u201cBut meanwhile whoever turns out to have created us, and even should he prove to be all-powerful and deceitful, we still experience a freedom through which we may abstain from accepting true and indisputable those things of which we have not certain knowledge, and thus obviate our ever being deceived.\u201d <\/a>[687]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Thus, we must acknowledge that Descartes, despite his pious language and form in the dedication to the Meditations<\/em> wants to prove \u201cphilosophically rather than theologically\u201d<\/em> and to appeal to the power of \u201cnatural reason\u201d<\/em>,<\/a>[688]<\/a> though he would surely retort he was surely defensibly Thomistic in that assumption.\u00a0 Nevertheless, we might thus caution ourselves from too readily appropriating Descartes who was ever mindful of the fate of Galileo, his choice to live in Holland was in his own words an act of self-preservation; he is almost universally acknowledged to have been the beginning of modern philosophy and perhaps to have shown God the epistemological exit door, at least as far as philosophy is concerned.\u00a0 Even accepting his proof, he was philosophically defending a generic theism rather than a specifically Christian conception that we are seeking to develop. \u00a0However, on balance, I am prepared to give Descartes the benefit of the doubt <\/a>[689]<\/a> and to accept that he does offer something<\/em> important apologetically when he recognised a divine guarantee for knowledge was the only guarantee there could be.\u00a0 It certainly had a transcendental feel when he emphatically assigned necessary<\/em> existence to God alone and considered the Cogito<\/em> as an intuited logical unit rather than as a syllogism. <\/a>[690]<\/a><\/sup> \u00a0We might fault him in how he worked his programme out but he had some important insights. \u00a0Nevertheless, Van Til found his approach inadequate in providing a true transcendental for knowledge, arguing that even if we accept the Cogito<\/em> its scope is parochial <\/a>[691]<\/a> and with that assessment we are obliged to concur.<\/p>\n

More specifically, Van Til rejected the egocentricity and the anthropocentricity of the Cartesian program because it began with the self and moved out from the self to prove God. \u00a0Rather, we must start with God\u2019s self-revelation to us, specifically in the scriptures and what they speak to us metaphysically, epistemologically, and ethically. \u00a0This might be \u201ccircular\u201d reasoning, but we have already seen it is not the vicious, logically fallacious circularity when our premise includes or assumes our conclusion.\u00a0 It is rather a transcendental<\/em>.\u00a0 That is, when we talk of \u2018circular\u2019 reasoning we are demonstrating that we are dealing with the ultimate or top-level authority claims for the justification<\/em> of our reasoning.\u00a0 If a claim has \u2018ultimate\u2019 status in our noetic structures, there is no external proof available, and we cannot help but employ it whilst arguing for its legitimacy.\u00a0 Only transcendental forms of argument have the unique feature that they provide the very grounds for their own legitimacy and conclude with a transcendental<\/em>, or precondition for their intelligibility.\u00a0 As Van Til put it:<\/p>\n

\u201cAt the outset it ought to be clearly observed that every system of thought necessarily has a certain method<\/em> of its own.\u00a0 Usually this fact is overlooked.\u00a0 It is taken for granted that everybody begins in the same way with an examination of the facts, and that differences between systems come only as a result<\/em>\u2026this is not actually the case.\u00a0 It could not actually be the case with a Christian.\u00a0 His fundamental and determining fact is the fact of God\u2019s existence.\u00a0 That is his final conclusion.\u00a0 But that must also be his starting point.\u00a0 If the Christian is right in his final conclusion about God, then he would not even get in touch with any fact unless it were through the medium of God<\/em>\u201d.<\/a>[692]<\/a> (Emphasis added).<\/p>\n

There is a remarkable amount of foundational epistemology packed into this paragraph.\u00a0 When it comes to our top-level or ultimate authority claims for the legitimacy of our worldview, it can only<\/em> be justified in terms of itself; that is, transcendentally.<\/p>\n

<\/a><\/a><\/a>4.8\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Transcendental Mode of Criticism<\/h2>\n

How then are we to evaluate a \u201cform of life\u201d or a worldview?\u00a0 The only method available to us is to examine their content<\/em> for coherence and logical consistency on their own terms<\/em> by engaging in a transcendental critique.\u00a0 We must immediately recognise that there can only be one, true transcendental; there may be attempts at arguing that a non-Christian worldview is transcendental, but the argument always fails, sometimes without too much effort, on close examination.\u00a0 For example, in an impressive Tour De Force<\/em> Van Tillian Bahnsen dismisses Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism and naturalism on their own terms <\/a>[693]<\/a> from their own writings whilst simultaneously conceding that if<\/em>, for example, Islam or any other worldview claims it is<\/em> the Word of God, it should<\/em> have been taken on its own authority.<\/p>\n

This is an important part of the concept of transcendental critique \u2013 just because something claims<\/em> to be a transcendental, it does not mean that it succeeds<\/em> in being so.\u00a0 An empiricist might want to claim that his empiricism is a transcendental principle of nature.\u00a0 However, we find that the \u2018verification principle\u2019 at its centre is arbitrary and self-refuting.<\/a>[694]<\/a> \u00a0We cannot go out into nature and observe the verification principle, it is rather a metaphysical dogma.\u00a0 Similarly, a rationalist might want to claim transcendentally that logic provides an a priori<\/em> basis for science, but different logicians argue over what counts as logic. \u00a0Quine\u2019s critique of Carnap\u2019s analytic-synthetic distinction was one of the most devastating attacks on the logic of empiricism. \u00a0Quine also denied that modal logic (the logic of necessity) was possible because it relied on intension and essences (Quine labelled this \u2018Aristotelian essentialism\u2019).\u00a0 However, in response, Plantinga\u2019s Nature of Necessity<\/em> contained a technical appendix dealing specifically with Quine\u2019s objection and concurs with it but rejects the implications Quine drew from the rejection \u2013 we thus conclude logicians argue with each other over the \u201cnature\u201d of logic and it certainly does not self-evidently provide its own foundation and thus demonstrate a transcendental character. Only a Christian with a transcendental basis for logic in the mind of the Christian God,<\/a>[695]<\/a> who\u2019s triune nature resolves the tension between the \u201cOne and the Many\u201d, of particular and kind, can sustain the claim to a genuine transcendental.<\/p>\n

<\/a><\/a><\/a>4.9\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Summary and Conclusion<\/h2>\n

In this chapter we have introduced transcendental reasoning.\u00a0 We had arrived at a philosophical impasse by considering the work of Quine and Kuhn which seemed to imply a relativistic terminus and where ethical commitments were readily characterised as Wittgensteinian fideism or with a purely voluntaristic, subjective basis. \u00a0That is, there was a \u201cform of life\u201d, and rationality might be defined and expressed within a theory, but that theory was just one of many possible, \u201cempirically adequate\u201d theories of the world. \u00a0Transcendentalism offered us a mode of reasoning that moved beyond this terminus.\u00a0 We examined that it was first associated with the philosophy of Kant, who defined as transcendental those principles that must be assumed to make any<\/em> knowledge of objects possible.<\/p>\n

This immediately served to provide us with the dictum that reasoning is implicitly circular, when we reason about reason, we are assuming the rationality of reason.\u00a0 Thus, we were able to discern that there is a categorical difference between the fallacy of circular reasoning where the premise in a syllogistic construction assumes the conclusion and the overall circularity of a theory of nature.\u00a0 We understood that the nature of transcendental reasoning was categorically distinct from inductive, deductive, or abductive reasoning and deals with conclusions which are principles with broad application to the world.\u00a0 We understood how the sceptical terminus was then rendered incoherent, we would have needed to have employed the cognitive processes to have had arrived at the conclusion that the cognitive processes are inadequate.<\/p>\n

Thus, by establishing a prima facie basis for reasoning we could examine something of the taxonomy of reason.\u00a0 We examined the main divisions of reasoning, the practical and the theoretical; the theoretical the mode of reason is that which allows us to analyse and posit about our world, and the practical dealing with our theory of value, both aesthetic and ethical.\u00a0 We concluded that we could not live in the world without reason and that being reasonable was ethically commendable.\u00a0 However, we noted that some ethical theorists, whilst passionately recognising the value of practical reason, struggled to define it in terms that were not tightly circular.\u00a0 In other words, they struggled to find a basis for reason that was adequately transcendental rather than voluntaristic.<\/p>\n

We probed that it was possible to move past this terminus by considering that an ultimate authority is what we assume transcendentally in all our reasoning.\u00a0 It is our transcendental that makes possible the grounds for its own proof and thus its own ethical commitments.\u00a0 We understood that part of the strategy of assessing the rival worldviews was to examine their internal relations on their own terms, if elements of the worldview are shown to be incoherent on analysis, their arguments are flawed, and they do not warrant the label \u201ctranscendental\u201d.\u00a0 We used the terms \u201cpresuppositional\u201d and \u201cworldview\u201d to describe our transcendental method, recognising that there is never a neutral place to start our reasoning from and to build our science upon.\u00a0 We bolstered our account by considering our position was analogous to the holism argued by Quine where he had argued it was in assuming a theory of the world that we would always speak, and that all our reasoning about the world must assume that theory.<\/p>\n

We also examined that Quine had recognised the place of normative ethical values and commitments, rejecting the scientistic assumptions of the positivists; there was no mere pluralistic tolerance, gratuitous torture was wrong regardless of the adequacy of the theoretical account of it.\u00a0 We noted Wittgenstein also argued that there was something that constituted a \u201cdecent\u201d human being and thus the characterisations of his philosophy as relativistic were faulty in this important ethical respect; he was also seen to employ transcendental modes of argument in his account of language as requiring a public context, further buttressing our account of the legitimacy of the mode of reasoning.\u00a0 However, we equally recognised the weakness of these accounts, Quine\u2019s account of moral commitments and his ethical theory was easily characterised as arbitrary, his worldview relying on a Darwinian conception of chance; Wittgenstein arguing meaning was tied with use which is problematic as a general theory for intercommunal relations, easily represented as supporting relativism.<\/p>\n

We argued that only a transcendent transcendental would more adequately address the charge of arbitrariness.\u00a0 We examined that both Van Til and Plantinga had epistemologies that though radically different in detail, relied on a transcendent transcendental assumption and that established both the consistency and coherence of their Christian worldviews.\u00a0 We also noted that Descartes can be interpreted in a transcendental fashion when he argues that systematic knowledge was not possible for an atheist.\u00a0 We noted the ambiguity in Descartes and that Van Til asserted that the cogito was not an adequate transcendental principle for knowledge because it defended a generic theism.\u00a0 It was also noted that the cogito could be conceived of in a fashion that supported atheism and was too narrow in scope to be considered a genuine transcendental.\u00a0 We also noted a fundamental weakness in Descartes epistemological conception which moved outwards from the self to God and then the natural world.\u00a0 We argued we must begin with God\u2019s self-revelation as a transcendental and build our metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics from the written Word of God. This established a very important principle; we are able to judge between rival transcendental claims by examining them on their own terms; just because we have a \u201cform of life\u201d that does not make it immune from critique.<\/p>\n

Thus, our next task is the proof that only<\/em> the Christian transcendental has sufficient coherence without an elaborate hermeneutic to reconcile its problems. <\/a>[696]<\/a>\u00a0 What we will see is unique about Van Til\u2019s use of transcendental argumentation is that it is not seeking to do a piecemeal refutation of a specific fact in or about nature but rather establish a principle by which the non-Christian worldview (in all its sub-genii) as a whole and<\/em> as a unit can be judged illegitimate and self-refuting.\u00a0 Thus, any<\/em> specific fact of nature should be able to be taken and only made intelligible<\/em> by assuming the Christian transcendental.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[635]<\/a> This is one of the most famous of the themes that emerges in Wittgenstein\u2019s Philosophical Investigations<\/em>.\u00a0 It is often mistaken for cultural relativism in that it is taken to argue for the circumscription of a community on the basis of shared linguistic use and convention.\u00a0 Similarly, it is often appropriated by postmodernists to deny the possibility of objective reference.\u00a0 However, in my view, these are rather appropriations of Wittgenstein\u2019s work in support of their own programmes rather than it being something argued for by Wittgenstein himself, illustrated in that there was an enormous debate over the \u201cmeaning\u201d of what he was in fact arguing (or whether he was even arguing at all), particularly in light of Kripke\u2019s (1982) interpretation.\u00a0 This matter features again in our discussion.<\/p>\n

See McGinn (1997) for a short, accessible and well received introduction to the Investigations<\/em>, there is a vast quantity of literature on the Investigations often of far longer length than the Investigations themselves which cover a vast swathe of territory (as indicated by Wittgenstein\u2019s last attempt at an Introduction) so McGinn did Wittgensteinian scholarship for novices a service here.\u00a0 See also Macneil (2014) for a broader discussion of Wittgenstein and religious language.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[636]<\/a> Fideism can be broadly conceived of in two main ways.\u00a0 Either that subjective experience rather than objective reason justifies religious belief (or even denies rational expression is possible in principle); or that a belief can only be understood within a believing community that uses language in a particular way and shares a form of life.\u00a0 The former might be considered characteristic of the Kierkegaardian \u2018leap of faith\u2019 and the latter as the basis for the famous dispute in the philosophy of religion between Wittgensteinian and Christian thinker D.Z. Phillips and atheist Kai Nielsen found in Nielsen & Phillips (2005).\u00a0 Phillips disagreed strongly with Plantinga (and Van Til) on the nature of Christian philosophy, see Phillips (1993); arguing there was a philosophical mode of thought available to all philosophers.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[637]<\/a> It is worth noting that for Kant, a transcendental <\/em>argument always<\/em> terminated in a category of the understanding.\u00a0 This is not necessarily the case with modern transcendental arguments and was the subject of an ill-tempered debate, see \u00a76.3.4.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[638]<\/a> A humorous meme exemplifies this well.\u00a0 Hume:\u00a0 science is just a habit of the mind, there is no causal necessity<\/em>.\u00a0 Kant:\u00a0 I can save science and causality, it is a habit of the mind, we necessarily think in the way we do<\/em>.\u00a0 Much ink has been spilled over whether Kant did in fact answer Hume and besides that, what precisely Kant meant<\/em> on his own terms.\u00a0 Plantinga (1994) noted that the polyvalency of Kant was \u201cpart of his charm\u201d<\/em>.\u00a0 Similarly, Scruton in his \u201cVery Short Introduction to Kant\u201d (2001) notes he \u201ctook sides\u201d<\/em> in some of his discussion.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[639]<\/a> One of the great debates when interpreting Wittgenstein is captured in these descriptions in the literature:\u00a0 he is seen to be descriptive in his work rather than prescriptive; he was explicating rules of philosophical grammar rather than syntax; he was not theorising but offering therapy; he was being pragmatic and phenomenological rather than dogmatic, thus in the application of his method in Phillips (1993) who \u2018pioneered the application of Wittgensteinian approaches to the philosophy of religion<\/em>\u2019 (Burley, (2012)).\u00a0 It was thus notable that in this section of the Investigations<\/em> that he proceeded to argue<\/em> and presented a complex, transcendental argument.\u00a0 However, not all have been impressed by it, notably for our purposes, Plantinga describes it as \u201cweak\u201d and in a new preface to his God and Other Minds<\/em> (1990 (1967)) notes that he would now spend much less time defending himself against Wittgensteinian criticisms. \u00a0In this era of artificial languages (particularly computer programming languages) we might see Plantinga\u2019s point; though we should also recognise that these languages are very different from spoken languages which is what Wittgenstein had in mind.\u00a0 We will visit Plantinga\u2019s objection shortly.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[640]<\/a> There are arguments which are said to take the \u201cform\u201d of a transcendental argument but are not full transcendental arguments, see \u00a77.3.3.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[641]<\/a> This procedure is demonstrated in outline in https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/applying-the-epistemological-self-consciousness-transcendental-critique-to-islam-hinduism-and-buddhism\/<\/a> .\u00a0 The emphasis here is \u2018in outline\u2019, there would need to be plenty more work to be done to present a comprehensive rebuttal.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[642]<\/a> See Baier, K. (1995). The Rational and the Moral Order – The Social Roots of Reason and Morality.<\/em> Chicago and LaSalle: Open Court., ch.1 for an explanation of the terms \u201ctheoretical\u201d and \u201cpractical\u201d reasoning.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[643]<\/a> We might still argue about its metaphysical status \u2013 there is a difference to what our theory says about the world and the way the world is (noting Quine\u2019s \u201cany of various<\/em>\u201d, see n.637), but we must defer that question to later sections.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[644]<\/a> Baier (1958\/1966) are generally considered landmarks in moral philosophy.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[645]<\/a> Blackburn, S. (1998). Ruling Passions – A Theory of Practical Reasoning.<\/em> Oxford: Clarendon.\u00a0 Blackburn was known for his direct confrontation with the postmodern pragmatism and ethical relativism argued by Richard Rorty and is considered to have made a substantial contribution to practical, i.e., ethical reasoning.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[646]<\/a> Baier, K. (1995). The Rational and the Moral Order – The Social Roots of Reason and Morality.<\/em> Chicago and LaSalle: Open Court., p.53<\/p>\n

<\/a>[647]<\/a> Blackburn, S. (1998). Ruling Passions – A Theory of Practical Reasoning.<\/em> Oxford: Clarendon., p.310.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[648]<\/a> Blackburn had taken great exception to Rorty\u2019s equivocation on this point and whilst respecting Rorty\u2019s erudition, offers a full-bodied, meticulous critique in Blackburn (2006) and Blackburn (1998).\u00a0 With the exception of when Blackburn encounters religious thought, he is painfully meticulous and fair in his argument; with religious thought he inexplicably seems to jettison his careful and considered method.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[649]<\/a> Neurath\u2019s conception of knowledge was far more dynamic and fluid (as seen in his famous raft metaphor) than many of his positivist peers and is perhaps best considered as a weaker, mitigated sceptical view when compared to Schlick.\u00a0 In his later period especially, he did not believe in a normative conception of science on the basis of a set of \u2018true\u2019 propositions as was favoured by many positivists. \u00a0He was much more akin to the pragmatist or instrumentalist, \u201csolve our problems\u201d approach to science. \u00a0Consequently, his conception of science is rather a rarefied one which is why we have favoured Quine in our discussion.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[650]<\/a> Quine, W. (1981). Theories and Things.<\/em> Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press., p.21.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[651]<\/a> As perhaps found in Richard Dawkins\u2019 A Scientist\u2019s Case Against God<\/em>, an edited version of his speech at the Edinburgh International Science Festival on April 15, 1992, published in The Independent<\/em>, April 20, 1992.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[652]<\/a> It is also worth noting that Quine\u2019s conception of \u201cscience\u201d was broad, he attaches scientific status to any statement that makes a contribution, no matter how slight, to a theory that can be tested through prediction, see Quine, W. V. (1992). Pursuit of Truth (Revised Edition)<\/em>., p.20. This correlates well with the argument I presented earlier in the thesis that the distance between science and philosophy, philosophy and theology, narrows (if it can be said to exist at all) on close inspection.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[653]<\/a> It is another matter as to whether that claim could be sustained<\/em> under critique; our position will be that the only transcendental claim that can be sustained will be the Christian transcendental claim.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[654]<\/a> Two of the most famous essays are Ontological Relativity<\/em> and Epistemology Naturalized<\/em> both in Quine (1969) and a third, On What There Is<\/em> originally published in 1948 with minor modifications to the version published in Quine (1980 (1953)).\u00a0 Quine wrote very little on ethics, following broadly the contours of Schlick (1939) in his On The Nature of Moral Values<\/em> (1981).\u00a0 The latter is interesting for the interaction of White (1986) with it and Quine\u2019s response in the same volume.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[655]<\/a> Quine, W. (1981). Theories and Things.<\/em> Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press., p.21.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[656]<\/a> In response to White (1986), Normative Ethics\/Epistemology, and Quine\u2019s Holism<\/em>, pp.664-665.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[657]<\/a> This is reminiscent in some respects of the \u201cmoral calculus\u201d of Jeremey Bentham (b.1748, d.1832), an early proto-socialist and reformer (who like many of his contemporary reformers was born into great wealth and patronage but took exception to it), who took as his governing maxim \u201cthe greatest happiness of the greatest number<\/em>\u201d as the ultimate aim of ethics and the sole descriptor of right and wrong, good and bad.\u00a0 Bentham had been greatly influenced by Hume and rejected all forms of idealism, collapsing ethical categories into quantifiable variables which are further indexed to the consequence <\/em>and not the motive <\/em>of an action.\u00a0 Thus, it was perfectly acceptable for Bentham that a person\u2019s motivation could be self-interested, corrupt, and dishonest as long as the resulting benefit outweighed any harm.<\/p>\n

This has some catastrophic implications, it would be permissible to torture if by torturing you prevent the torturing of others (how contemporary that view remains is perhaps captured in the 2021 film The Mauritanian <\/em>concerning the torture at Guantanamo Bay) as well as a whole host of other practices such as social conditioning, forced abortion as population control, sterilisation of undesirables, eugenic innovations etc. which many would consider immoral.\u00a0 It was left to his contemporary and immediate successor, John Stuart Mill to develop this view, known as utilitarianism<\/em> (coined by Bentham himself) into a less crass and a more benevolent form which became the foundation for many of the Victorian era liberal democracies and their social reforms.\u00a0 Mill\u2019s On Liberty<\/em> (1859) for example, is considered one of the most important works of political philosophy ever published; as Bahnsen noted, this should be a required text for an educated person.\u00a0 See Crimmins (2021) for a thorough review of Bentham; the edition of Mill\u2019s On Liberty<\/em> I include in the bibliography also has three other essays and an excellent introduction to Mill\u2019s thought.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[658]<\/a> In response to White (1986), Normative Ethics\/Epistemology, and Quine\u2019s Holism<\/em>, p.665.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[659]<\/a> Quine, W. (1981). Theories and Things.<\/em> Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press., p.22.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[660]<\/a> See Churchland & Hooker (1985) for the substance of this debate, focussed on the \u2018constructive empiricism\u2019 of Bas C van Fraassen.\u00a0 He authors a lengthy reply to 10 critical essays.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[661]<\/a> Quine, W. (1981). Theories and Things.<\/em> Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press., preface.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[662]<\/a> Quine, W. V. (1981). On the Nature of Moral Values. In W. Quine, Theories and Things<\/em> (pp. 55-66). Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press., pp.64-65;\u00a0 see also White (1986) and Quine\u2019s reply for an indication that Quine recognised an \u201cultimacy\u201d for moral judgments that sat legitimately apart from scientific objectivity.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[663]<\/a> Van Til, C. (2008 (1955)). The Defense of the Faith<\/em> (4th ed.). Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing., pp.18-19, 19n78, 160.\u00a0 Oliphint\u2019s editorial note on p.19 is significant; Van Til did not mean some kind of Kuhnian or Rortian relativism where \u2018everything is under a description\u2019 but rather that without the Christian \u201cinterpretation\u201d of a fact, it is a \u201cmute\u201d fact \u2013 it can say nothing.\u00a0 However, in light of Quine\u2019s conception of \u201cfactuality\u201d as worldview dependent, I do consider there is still sufficient contact with the Rortian or Kuhnian sense that the worldview<\/em> gives the fact its interpretation.\u00a0 It is just for Rorty or Kuhn that the worldview was subjective, conventional, and arbitrary; for us, we can claim objectivity \u2013 harmony with the mind of God.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[664]<\/a> Quine, W. (1981). Theories and Things.<\/em> Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press., p.23.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[665]<\/a> Plantinga, A. (2015). Knowledge and Christian Belief.<\/em> Grand Rapids: William B Eerdmans., p.46.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[666]<\/a> Plantinga argues this concept is also found in Aquinas, Augustine and the biblical epistles of Paul.\u00a0 He thus refers to it as the extended A\/C model.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[667]<\/a> This becomes increasingly clear as one progresses through the chapters of Knowledge and Christian Belief <\/em>(2015).\u00a0 Chapters 5 and 6 tie his apologetic tightly to Calvin and Edwards; so although he is often criticised as having departed from classical or orthodox \u201cReformed\u201d dogmatics, he defends himself with the primary sources of scripture, Calvin and other Reformed heroes such as Edwards. \u00a0The material in these chapters I consider the most apologetic and effective of Plantinga\u2019s work I have read.\u00a0 It has a nourishing spiritual richness to it as William J Abraham (Perkins School of Theology) also notes in the backmatter.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[668]<\/a> Bahnsen, G. (1998). Van Til’s Apologetic – Readings and Analysis.<\/em> Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing., pp.518-519; p.518nn121,122.\u00a0 The main text is Van Til\u2019s, n121 was a footnote added by Van Til; n122 was an explanatory note added by Bahnsen.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[669]<\/a> In this sense, he is close to the position of Neurath\u2019s sailors, where the raft has to be rebuilt at sea because there is no dry-docking capability.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[670]<\/a> Quine, W. V. (1986). Response to Morton White. In L. E. Hahn, & P. A. Schlipp (Eds.), The Philosophy of W.V. Quine<\/em> (pp. 663-668). La Salle: Open Court., p.664.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[671]<\/a> Richter, D. J. (n.d.). Wittgenstein, Ludwig<\/em>. Retrieved March 17, 2022, from Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/wittgens\/<\/a>, Section 5.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[672]<\/a> See, for example, Engelmann, P., & Wittgenstein, L. (1968). \u00a0See also Wittgenstein (2007) and Wittgenstein (2006).<\/p>\n

<\/a>[673]<\/a> Engelmann, P., & Wittgenstein, L. (1968). Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein – with A Memoir.<\/em> New York: Horizon Press., p.11\/letter 12.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[674]<\/a> The \u201csocially constructed\u201d thesis is associated with the ground-breaking work of Berger & Luckmann (1991 (1966)).\u00a0 However, what is notable in their account, is the complete omission<\/em> of any direct discussion of ethics or morality (even the index has no entry for either).\u00a0 They also made it plain in their opening remarks that they were using a weakened sense of the word \u201cknowledge\u201d (pp. 25ff) that certainly indicates an enormous \u2018red flag\u2019 for the critical reader regarding their overall thesis; it should certainly be pushed to provide an epistemological account of its presuppositions.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[675]<\/a> Richter, D. J. (n.d.). Wittgenstein, Ludwig<\/em>. Retrieved March 17, 2022, from Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/wittgens\/<\/a>, Section 6.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[676]<\/a> God And Other Minds.<\/em>\u00a0 The original edition appeared in 1967 and was reissued with a new preface in 1990.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[677]<\/a> See the New Preface to the 1990 edition, where he states he was responding to the Wittgensteinian argument at many places in the book when he originally wrote it.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[678]<\/a> See https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/van-til-and-plantinga-comparison-and-contrast\/<\/a> for more background on the RE project.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[679]<\/a> Everitt (2004), p.30 gives a useful summary of the RE literature and the ensuing debate which has remained robust within the philosophy of religion.\u00a0 However, Everitt was somewhat anachronistic in his presentation, presenting the \u2018RE\u2019 movement in a manner that reflected the position in the mid-1980s; Everitt never grants Plantinga\u2019s strengthening of the position and never undertakes a reassessment in light of the later work despite making reference to the existence of that literature in the \u2018Further Reading\u2019 section with which he closed out the chapter. \u00a0Plantinga himself believed he had further developed his position through the Warrant<\/em> trilogy (1992, 1993, 2000) and published a compressed version of the main argument of this series in 2015 which has a significantly more ecumenical feel and less of the \u2018Reformed\u2019 moniker, though Plantinga himself asserts in it that \u2018Reformed\u2019 was never intended to imply criticism of RC epistemology; perhaps understandable with his joining the great Catholic institution of Notre Dame.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[680]<\/a> This point is made in Collet (n.d.), n42.\u00a0 Craig made this claim in William Lane Craig, \u201cA Classical Apologist\u2019s Response,\u201d in Five Views on Apologetics (ed. Stanley N. Gundry and Steven B. Cowan; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2000), p.233.\u00a0 \u201cClassical Apologetics\u201d in this sense refers to the Old Princeton approach of the late 19th<\/sup> and Warfieldian era of Princeton (cf. Aquinas\u2019s \u2018classical arguments\u2019; Craig was following the expansion of the term to include evidentialism, see \u00a71.3.2), which is continued in some of the more conservative Reformed seminaries.\u00a0 \u201cNew\u201d Princeton has a far more liberal, ecumenical theology and thus its apologetics are markedly weaker.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[681]<\/a> This was a debate captured in Nielsen, K., & Phillips, D. (2005).<\/p>\n

<\/a>[682]<\/a> Descartes, R. (2003). Meditations and Other Metaphysical Writings.<\/em> (M. Clarke, Trans.) London: Penguin., pp.99-104.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[683]<\/a> Bernard Williams, \u2018Introductory Essay\u2019 in Meditations on First Philosophy \u2013 with selections from the Objections and Replies<\/em>, John Cottingham (ed), pxvi<\/p>\n

<\/a>[684]<\/a> Pro 9:10, KJV.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[685]<\/a> Schouls, P. A. (1989). Descartes and the Enlightenment.<\/em> Edinburgh: McGill-Queens Press., pp60-63, n60.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[686]<\/a> Descartes, R. in <\/em>Cottingham,J., Stoothoff,R., Murdoch, (trans), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Volume II)<\/em> (New York:\u00a0 Cambridge University Press, 2008), p37<\/p>\n

<\/a>[687]<\/a> Descartes, R. in <\/em>Cottingham,J., Stoothoff,R., Murdoch, (trans), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Volume 1)<\/em> (New York:\u00a0 Cambridge University Press, 2008), p194<\/p>\n

<\/a>[688]<\/a> Descartes, R. (2003). Meditations and Other Metaphysical Writings.<\/em> (M. Clarke, Trans.) London: Penguin., p.8.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[689]<\/a> In Macneil (2014a) I discuss these issues more fully and conclude by giving Descartes the benefit of the doubt.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[690]<\/a> John Cottingham, Descartes<\/em> (Oxford:\u00a0 Blackwell, 1997), p36<\/p>\n

<\/a>[691]<\/a> According to Bahnsen (1995), Van Til would frequently characterise Descartes\u2019 cogito to his students as \u201ca rock in a bottomless ocean\u201d<\/em> emphasising its narrow achievement even if we accept it.\u00a0 We examine why such a parochial argument fails the transcendental designation in \u00a77.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[692]<\/a> Van Til, C. (1998). Revelational Epistemology. In G. Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic – Readings and Analysis<\/em> (pp. 165-186). Phillipsburg: P & R Publishing., p.170.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[693]<\/a> I based a popular article https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/applying-the-epistemological-self-consciousness-transcendental-critique-to-islam-hinduism-and-buddhism\/<\/a> on this argument.\u00a0 This was an attempt to introduce a difficult procedure in an accessible manner, and so should not be considered a comprehensive argument.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[694]<\/a> However, Baird (2003) has suggested that the verification principle might be understood in a transcendental fashion.\u00a0 This seems to me equivalent to suggesting the principle is analytic.\u00a0 Baird is beginning from a Christian premise and seeks to dissolve Stroud\u2019s objections to transcendental arguments which have dominated the debate over them.\u00a0 I discuss this reasoning when considering the TAG (Transcendental Argument for God), see \u00a77.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[695]<\/a> The prologue of John and John\u2019s repeated use of the loaded term \u201clogos\u201d is a compelling argument regarding the foundations of logic which space does not permit us to examine further other than to note its importance as an issue of apologetic dispute here.\u00a0 \u201cLogos\u201d does not just mean \u201clogic\u201d, it is a much stronger conception, contra Clark (1988).\u00a0 Butler (2010) addresses Clark\u2019s contention by noting that the Greek\u2019s had other words that they used at the time John was writing that would have been much closer to our use of the word \u201clogic\u201d; it was not until around the 4th<\/sup> century that logic would have been the preferred meaning. Clark was a competent logician though and this work is worth reading as an introductory work from a Christian perspective on that basis.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[696]<\/a> This is not to deny the importance of hermeneutics to Christian thought or of philosophical hermeneutics more generally.\u00a0 Our consideration of the problem of circularity is also known as the \u201chermeneutic circle\u201d \u2013 the problem of circularity is<\/em> a problem of hermeneutics as are preunderstanding we bring to a text, presupposition, and the role of the transcendental, see Thiselton (2009), probably the definitive graduate text on the subject.\u00a0 The 2012 20th<\/sup> anniversary edition of his New Horizons in Hermeneutics<\/em> was also a substantive milestone in the subject, a masterful exposition noted for its engagement with and critique of postmodernism; postmodernism which was highly influential during the period he originally wrote it and many Christians felt that \u201cmaking room for the sacred\u201d in postmodernism meant making room for them.\u00a0 However, this was a kindergarten mistake and Thiselton offers a substantial critique of the limitations of postmodernism \u2018that most Christians do not realise\u2019. \u00a0It would also be amiss of me if I did not also note his The Two Horizons<\/em> (1980), originally his PhD dissertation described by the eminent Professor J B Torrance as \u2018one of the most competent dissertations I have ever read<\/em>\u2019 which \u201cburst on the scene\u201d (Thiselton\u2019s words) and established his reputation.<\/p>\n

\n
\n
A Christian Conception of Philosophy<\/a><\/div>\n
The Christian Presupposition<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

4\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Beyond Anti-Philosophy to Transcendentalism 4.1\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Transcendentalism \u2013 First Remarks We seem to be confronted with a most basic philosophical problem that has become increasingly into focus whether we approach the problem from a naturalist direction as in Quine and Kuhn or seek an authentically Christian philosophy through Plantinga and Van Til.\u00a0 It appears we […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":972,"parent":1391,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-1419","page","type-page","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry"],"yoast_head":"\r\nBeyond Anti-Philosophy to Transcendentalism - Planet M Blog<\/title>\r\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Beyond Anti-Philosophy to Transcendentalism - THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS PROJECT\" \/>\r\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\r\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/planetmacneil.org\/blog\/phd\/beyond-anti-philosophy-to-transcendentalism\/\" \/>\r\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_GB\" \/>\r\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\r\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Beyond Anti-Philosophy to Transcendentalism - 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